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Response

-

Petrs are the registrars in California. Resps, three

-

ex-felons, sought a writ of mandate to compel election

officials (petrs) to register them as voters. The Cal Sup Ct
~el~ relying on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 LI.So 330 (1972),
that "disenfranchisement by reason of conviction of crime is
no longer constitutionally permissible" and, "as applied to
all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have expired,
the provisions of Art II and Art XX of the Cal Constitution
denying the right of suffrage to all persons convicted of
crime, •• violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," Petrs appealed.
Petrs position is that the disenfranchisement

-

,_ '

...
of ex-felons has been universally approved in the federal
courts, at least until Dunn. Many circuit court cases
uphold such a practice, and the supreme Court has often
remarked that a criminal record may be taken into account
in determining the qualification of voters. Furthermore,
sec 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes reference to
the
the fact that~ right to vote may be abridged by
a State because of participation in crime and that
x----------a State's representation in the House of Representatives
shall not be reduced as a result of such disqualifications.
In respense, resp rely on Dunn for the propesition that
the State's restrictions on the right to vote can only
be justified if suuh restrictions are shown to be
"necessary."
I think the question involved is a substantial
one, especially in view of the revolutionary implications
of

~o

But since this

case arises from a state court,

rather than a federal court, maybe its best to let this
one pass by silently in the night. If this case arose
from one of the federal circuit courts, considerations
of federalism would favor gnanting cert. For the present,
I would think it advisable to leave the Cal Sup Ct's
decision undisturbed.
DENY

I
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In due course, I will circulate a dissent in
this case.

T.M.
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72-1598, Richardson v. Ramirez
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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Recirculated:
Viola N. Richardson, as County
On Writ of Certiorari
Clerk, Etc., Petitioner,
to the Supreme Court
v.
of California.
Abran Ramirez et al.
[April -, H)74]

MR.

MARSHALL, dissenting.
This case draws into question the constitutionality of
provisions of the California Constitution and implementing statutes disenfranchising ex-felons. The Supreme
Court of California held that those disenfranchising provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although I believe this case is moot,
if required to determine the merits of the controversy, J
would affir.m the judgment of the court below.
JUSTICE

I
I am persuaded that the case before us is moot, hence
there is no dispute judicially cognizable under the powers
conferred by Art. III. A brief retracing of the procedural history of the case is necessary to an understanding
of my views. Each of the respondents, the plaiutiffs
below, had been convicted of a non voting related felony
and had fully served his term of incarceration and parole.
Each applied to register to vote in his respective countyRamirez in San Luis Obispo County, Lee in Monterey
County, and Gill in Stanislaus County. All three were
refused registration because, under applicable provisions
of the California Constitutio11 , "no person convicted of
any infamous crime shall exercise the privilege of an
elector.'' 1
1
California Con~ti1 ution, Ari. II , § 1 provided, in part, that
''no person convicted of any infamous crime ... shall ever exerci~e

,,
,.
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The three named plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of California/
challenging the constitutionality of the State's disenfranchisement of ex-felons. They brought suit "individually and on behalf of all other persons who are
ineligible to register to vote in California solely by reason of a conviction of a felony other than an election
code felony" and who had fully served his or her term
of incarceration and parole. They named, as defendants.
the election officials who had refused to register them,
"individually and as representatives of the class of all
other County Clerks and Registrars who have the duty
of deterrn.ining for their respective counties whether any
ex-felon will be denied the right to vote."
The three named election officials did not contest the
action and represented to the state court that they
would permit respondents, and all similarly situated exfelons in thrir counties, to register and to vote. The
representativr of the Secretary of State of California,
also named as a defendant. similarly agreed not to contest the suit and the ~ccretary's office has filed a memoranduni opposing certiorari in this Court.a At this
point i11 thr litigation all of the named plaintiffs had
been voluntarily afforded the relief they were seeking
and none remained in the class of ex-felons disenfranchised by California law.
thr Jlrivil0g0s of an l'll'ctor in thii< Stat<'.' '

~-

Artie·](' II,§ 1 wa~ r0p0alf'd

by rdrrrnd11m at tlw :-:m·c·mlwr 7. H)71. g<'ll<'ral t>lc'cl1011 ,111d wn;;
n•placPd b~ ii II!' \\' Ari. 11 , § ;3 c·0111aimng tlw s:t11H' prohibition.
Tlw t-,tHlc• impl1·nH·n1mg i<(,tt1it<·~ ineh1dc• CaliforniH Ek•etion Cod<>
§§ :no. :3'.n, :1N:3. :lN!:J. :mo, and 1-t.W.
~ Thi,-; cn,-;c• wa,-; within the original jmi~dietion of tlw Supr!'me
Comf of C'a lifornia
" The• .\ltonH·~ (;l'lll'l:tl li:i, fikd :1 ,pp:1ral1• pl'lit1u11 lor C'<'rtwrnri
lo l'l'\H'\\ thP j11dgm<·11t of llit· :-,11pn•1111 · C'omt ol l'aliforniH . Th<·
:-;l'l'l'<'lar~ of :-,1 ,111 · fill'd a ll\l'n1or:111d11111 oppoi<ing 1lw1. pPti11011 for
<·vrt 1orari.

·....
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Subsequently, the petitioner in this Court, Viola
.Richardson, as County Clerk of Memlociuo County, filed
a motion to intervene_ in the proceedings before the
Supreme Court of California. She indicated to thE! court
that she was being sued in a separate action in a lower
state court by an ex-felon seeking to register in her
county and that the decision in this case would be dispositive of the legal issue in that controversy. The
State Suprcrne Court ordered Richardsou added as a
named defendant i11 th(1 instant action, but did not name
the ex-felon plailltiff in the suit agai11st her as a natned
class representative.
The Supreme Court of California ulti1nately found the
ex-felon discllfra11chisemcllt provision of the California
Constitution and its implementing statutes unconstitutional under tlw Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen th Amendment. 1.~hc~ state court did not, however,
deem it necessary to issue the prc-emptory writ of mandamus sought by the plaintiffs.
To both thP Supreme Court of California and the majority today, it appeared that "there was uo prcsellt dispute on the issuP of the right to register to vote between
the three named individual plaintiffs'' alld the defendants. The California court nonetheless proceeded to
adjudicate the merits of the controversy, rejecting suggestions of moot11css 011 the grounds that this suit fell
within that t·la:--s of ca:--t':-: prt';w11tiug issl!PS "capab]p of
l'<'[)<'titiu11. yPt Pvadi11g rc'vi('11·.·· I 1-1111 IH'r:--t11Hl<'d . hO\\t'ver. that this is not such a c·a:--t'.
Th<' '·<·apahle of r0p0tition. y(•t c•vadi11g n•vic•\\ ·, i!o(·tri11(' of 8outhern />11/"i/ic H. Co. ,·. ICC, :21!) l'. S. 40~ .
.'ilfl ( l D11) rc'quirc'" th<' :-::aLi~fac-Limi of two tPsts ill
ord<•r to prPvid<' a11 a11S\\'Pr Lo a suggPstioll of mootlless.
First. till' C'lain1t'd d<'privatio11 rn11~t. i11 fatt. h<' "eapabh•
of rq)('titiu11 ,'· a~ hy the c·o11ti1111i11g appliC'atioll of a

72-158!:l-DTSSE:NT
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challenged statute. Contrary to the suggestions of the
majority, this element is clearly satisfied where the chal~
lenged statute may continue to bc-> appJic,d to unnamed
class members. For example. i11 Dw111 v. Blumstein, 405
U . S. 3;-30 ( HJ72). the Court struck clown a durational
residence requir<'rnen t for voting. The suit had been
brought to compel the registration of the named plain~
tiff and the members of the class he represented in order
that they might participate in an election scheduled for
August 6. 1070. The District Court did not order preliminary relief in tirne for tlw August election and by
the time the District Court decided the case, the 11ext
election was scheduled for l\overnber of HJ70. By then.
the named plaintiff would hav<' met the challenged threemonth requirem!'nt. Th<' District Court. nonetheless.
rejected the Stat<' 's argument that the controversy over
the validity of the three-month requirement was therefore moot. \Ye agr<'Pcl. By the time the appeal reached
this Court. the only named plaintiff had also satisfied
the one-year state residence requirement. We nonethe]et;s reached the merits, observing that "although appcllee
I the only named plaintiff! can now vote, the problem to
voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirement is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. R. 814, 816 ( HJ6~)) ." 405 U. S .. at 3:33 n. 2.
Both this Court and the District. Court found that although the named plaintiff had satisfied the challenged
residence requirements and was 110 longer dise11fra11chised thereby, the case was not moot, 1 because the
challenged requirf'rncnt remained applicable to unnamed
1
Thr Court cli~ti11gui,;lwd it., <kl"i~io11 in Tia//,·. Heals, :39!1 rr. S.
45 (19(i!J) , finding ;1 chnl1P11gl' to C'olorndo'~ dmatio11nl rt'~idrme
n•qnirrnw11t moot, 011 th<' ground~ that. i11 Ila/I. t lwn· had bPC'II a11
i11tC'rvr11i11g <'lrnng<> in law r<·d11ri11g 1h<· rP~idenrc· n•q11irr11wnt,; from
Fix month,, to two 11·hilr tlH' rn~r wn,; 011 appral.

.. '

72-1589-DISSENT
RICHARDSON v. RAMIREZ

5

dass members" and the mere passage of a few months
would invariably render their individual claims mootvirtually foreclosing judicial review.
Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 40g
U.S. 540 (1973), relied on by the majority, is not to the
contrary. Burney concerned a constitutional challenge
to the termination of unemployment insurance benefits
without a prior hearing. The only named class representative received a post-termination hearing at which
she obtained a reversal of the initial determination of
ineligibility and full retroactive benefits. In the Court's
view, the named plaintiff's claim for relief was therefore moot, but see id., at 542-545 ( dissenting opinion),
and the rnootness issue revolved around whether the
case presented questions "capable of repetition, yet eva,ding review. " The Court did not find the alleged constitutional deprivation incapable of repetition. Rather, it
appeared that the prior hearing issue was not one which
would evade review. A post-termination hearing, afforded as a matter of course, would not invariably moot
all claims for relief from members of the class. If the
post-terminatio11 hearing did not result in an award of
retroactive payments, as it had in the named plaintiff's
case, a live and con tin ui11g controversy would be presented as to the insured's claim to the benefits allegedly
wrongfully withheld pending the hearing.,; A case had
already come to this Court in just such a posture, and
the Court affirmed on the merits without opinion.
Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 405
~ In contrast, the Court has hPld that Art. III rei:;trirt8 standing
lo bring a cla8s action to thl' actual rnPmber8 of the c]ai:;s. O'Shea v.
Littleton, U. S. (1974). The named plaintiffs had been
disenfranchii:;ed at the tim<' thry filed i:;ul1.
6
Compare Indiana Employment Security v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540
(1973), with id., nt 542 ( di8,:;enting opinion),

z
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U. S. 949 (1972).' It was on the "evading review" element of the test that the Court found Burney moot. It
is on that same element of the test that I believe this
case falters.
The content of the "evading review'' element of the
Bouthern Pacific doctrine is evidenced by a brief review
of the relevant cases. For example, in Roe v. JiVade,
410 U. S. 113 ( 1973), we held that a continuing controversy over the constitutionality of Texas' abortion
laws existed even though the named plaintiff may not
have been pregnant at later stages of the appeal. We
concluded that the case provided a classic example of
an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review.
"[TJhe human gestation period is so short that pregnancy will come to term beforE' the usual appellate
process comes to a conclusion. If that termination
makes a case moot, ... appellate review will be effectively denied.'' Id., at 125. 8
More to the point are the voting cases in which the
Court has found an issue capable of repetition yet evading review even though intervening circumstances seemed
to have mooted the named plaintiff's claim for relief.
Perhaps the leading case of this genre is Moore v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 814 (1969). Moore was an appeal from a
decision denying relief to appellants who had unsuccessfully sought to be certified, as required by state law, as
7
But se0 Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 410
U. S. 971 (197:3) (dis~0nting opinion).
8 Roe v. Jl'ade d0mon8trat08 th0 di::;tin C't ion brtw0011 ~tnnding 1111d
mootnf'ss clisru~,;rd at 11. 5, supra. Thr Roi' Court h0ld that a woman
who wm; not prC'gnant did not ha,·p ::;tanding to challenge the Texas
abortion law~. But the Court also drt0rminf'd that the trrmination
of a plaintiff's prC'gnancy whilr tl\C' ca~C' wa::; on appeal did not
rt'nder thr rontrovPr::;~· moot-rvrn though a woman who8e prrgnancy ha8 ('nclecl is no morr affect('d b~· thr abortion laws than a
woman who wa:,; not pregnant, at the time thi8 8Uit wa8 filed .

~-

.,
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independent candidates for Presidential elector on the
1968 ballot. Appellants asserted that the Illinois cer~
tification requirement violated the State's constitutional
obligation not to discriminate against voters in less popu~
lous counties. By the time their appeal reached this
Court, the 1968 election had already taken place, but we
held the case was not moot because "while the Hl68
election is over, ... the cha1lenged burden remains and
controls future elections." Id., at 816. See Hall v.
Beals, 3% U. R. 45, 49 ( 1969). The short span of time
between the denial of certification for candidacy and
actual ballottiug threatened to moot all future attacks
on the questioned candidacy requirements. Thus, the
case presented a constitutional issue "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 394 U. S., at 816. See
Storer v. Brown, - U. S. - , - n. 8 ( 1974); Rosario
v. Rocke!eller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 ( 1973); Goosby v.
Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 517 ( 1973).
There is a common thread running through these
cases-!n each the plaintiff's claim would inevitably
Jnature into mootness pending resolution of the lawsuit.
In Roe, the termination of pregnancy, in Dunn, the passage of the residency requirerneut period and in the
other voting cases, the occurrence of an election deprived
the plaintiff of a continuing controversy over the application of the challenged statute. In each instance, the
mere passage of time threatened to insulate a constitu~
tional deprivation from judicial review. Where an invalid statute would thus continue to be applied simply
because judicial review of a live controversy was invariably foreclosed-the issue would be capable of repetition yet evading review.
Because the claim raised in this case concerns not a
time related but rather a status based deprivation, there
is no issue capabl<' of repetition, yet evacliug revie'vY.

72-1589-DISSENT
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'This is not a situation whore by the time the case reaches
this Court, it will always be too late to grant relief. If
and whc11 au ex-felon is refused access to the voting
rolls because of his past criminal record. an intervening
election will not moot his claim for relief a11d the
status giving rise to his disenfranchisement will not i11evitably terminate 1w11ding review.
More in point, there arc clearly ways i11 which a cha.1lengc to the California disenfranchisement provisions
could reach this Court. The Supreme ( 'ourt of California has not issued a writ of mandamus compelling tlw
registration of any ex-felon. lf such a potential voter
is, in fact, refosocl registration, a controversy suitablt>
for resolutio11 in tlw federal courts will be presented .
The suit brought against petitioner Richardson, by an
ex-felo11 residt>11t of her own county, raising the same
issues as those presented by this case, is presrntly ponding in a California intermediate appellate court. 0 111
that case, petitioner Richarclso11 did. i11 fact, do11y the
plaintiff registratio11 because lw was an ex-felon. OncC'
that case comph'tes its passage through the state courts.
it could \\'ell serve as a vehicle for our review of the
California disenfra11chiscme11t provisio11s. That is, of
course, but one examplP of how the issue presented here
could reach this Court. rendering the issue> capable of
repetition but not likPly to evade review.
Because this case docs 11ot present an issue capable of
repetition yet e>vading rc,view, we can look only to the
named plaintiffs for a conti11uing case or controversy to
satisfy the rcquin'nw11ts of Art. Ill. The named plain,
tiffs here were registl'rC'd 011ly because the registrars in
their counties had voluntarily abandoned their allegedly
Riclwrd11011 v. James & Rich,
1w11ding iu Divi~ion :3 of the Court
App0AJ,., for tlw Fir~t App(·llatt• Di~tri('t of C'nliforniu ,

u Tlw ~uit again,.,t ,.... Hidwnbon.

ardson . l Civ. :{228:{, i,.,

or

Jll'l 'H'lll I~·
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iliegal practice of disenfra11chising ex:-ielc;;us, We have
said that the "mere voluntary cessation of illegal conduct
does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be com•
pelled to leave ' [ t] he clefendan t free to return to his
old ways .. .' [But] A case might become moot if sub~
sequent events made it absolutely clear that the alleged
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. i99 (1968); accord, United States
v. vV. 'I.'. Grant Co. 345 F. S. 629, 632 (1953). Thus, in
order to determine whether the named plaintiffs have
a live cou trovC'rsy over the validity of the challenged
provisions requires a determination of whether that disenfranchisement "could reasonably be expected to recur. ''
There are significa11t indications in the record that such
a possibility is remote. The registrars have not nterely
registered the named plaintiffs so as to suggest a scheine
to moot the controversy. 011 the cont,rary, the regis- )
trars have agreed to register all ex-felons in their counties. This conduct militates agai11st the possibility that
disenfranchisement is apt to recur as to the named plai11tiffs. Moreover, the scope of the registrars' voluntary
relief supports their protestations that they did not
merely abandon their alleged misconduct on threat of
suit, but genuinely agree with the merits of plaintiff's
claim, hence are pledged to continuing the policy of
registering ex-felons. Finally. both Tl'. T. Grant and
Phosphate E.rpvrl Assn. involved thf' voluntary cessation
of illegal conduct by defrndants in government antitrust
suits. l n those casC's, there were likely economic incentives to resume the challenged conduct once the litigation
had come to a11 end .'" Obviously. the registrars who
10
Th<• Court in Plw.sphal e F:.1·porl A.~~11. l'omid a claim that t fip
11artic-11lar c·hallrnged c•onduct- intrrlorkinir clin·ctornt<•s- was no
longn profitabi<'. intiulfirirnt to rendrr the• t·a~< · moot . Th<> ( '011r!
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have begun registering ex-felons have no simila.r selfinterest in resuming their prior rnisconcluct. 11
Finally, the majority suggests that although this case
might be moot if brought in the federal system, it is
uot moot because it arose from a state court and there is
a substantial public interest in its resolution. Neither
consideration is relevant. The inability of the federal
judiciary "to review moot cases derives from thr rt'quirement of Article Ill of the Constitution under which the
exercise of the judicial power depends 011 the existeuce
of a case or controversy." J..,i11er v. Jafc:J, Inc., 375 U. S.
301, 306 11. 3 ( 1964). J::.hat the Supreme Court of California, unencumbered by tlw case or controversy requirement of Art I IT, may baw rcpdered an advisory opinion,
does not free this Court from the bounds of its j uris_diction.
Elven in cases arising ill the state courts,
the question of mootncss is a federal one, which a federal court must resolve befor(' it assumes jurisdiction.''
Korth Carolina"· Rice, 401 U. ~- 244, 246 (1971). Nor
does the fact that the case may present issues of great
public importance free us from our constitutional bounds.
DeFunis v. Odeyanrd, P. ~- - , (1974). Since
the "case or controversy " rPquircnwnt of Art. III is not
here met, in my view, the proper disposition of this casE·
would be to vacate the judg1ncnt of the Supreme Court
of California and remand for such proceedings as that
court deems appropriate. Brockinyton v. Rhodes, 396
41, 44 (1969) .

"r

u. s.

appnrrntly did not ron:;iciC'r 1hat rc•prr~Pntnt10n adequatr assurauce
I hat tlw dC'fendnut~ had 110 ill<"<'llt 1vr to re81unr their mii;ronduct .
11
TlwrC1 is. of roursr, thr po,"ihilit~· that HUCCCi:i,;Or8 to the rrgi,;trars
in t hl' 11nmrd plaintiff~' <·01111t i<', might not continue the pr<'i:iCllt
n•g;i"t rnr~ ' polirir" of allowmg rx-1'<•1011,,; to votr. The J>os,;ible condu<·t of futun' r<'gi~trnr~ 1" ,i11,t too "lJl'C't1lat1vr to provide a livCI
<"ontrO\'l'r,,;y. See S7wmP1 \'. Littleton , U. S. (1974) .
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It
Since the majority seems determined to run roughshod
bver the limitations of Art. III in order to reach the
merits, 1 feel constrained to express my views on that
subject as well.
The right to vote "is the essence of a democratic society
and any restriction on that right strikes at the very heal't
of representative government." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U. S. 533, 535 (Hl64). Accordingly we have repeatedly
held that voting is a "fundamental" right, hence "if a
challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizeliS
and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are 11ecessary to promote a
gompelliug 8tate interest." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330, 337 (1972) .
The majority seeks to distinguish Dunn, supra, a
applying the compelling state interest test to the subject
voting restrictions only because the "fundamental" right
of interstate travel was involved. Next the majority
announces that the "Williarns-Krarner-Dunn" compelling
state interest test does not apply to all election cases,
and is inapposite to the one before us. No effort is made
to provi<le criteria for determining to what voting cases
the stringent test of Kramer and Dunn should apply.
Contrary to the view of the majority, the Dunn Court
made it absolutely clear that the application of the strict
scrutiny standard of review was justified by the fact that
the benefit being withheld was the fundamental right to
vote. Dunn merely applied the well accepted doctrine
that the complete disenfranchisement of a class of potential voters must be founded on a compelling state interest.
It i~. in fact , the distinction between actual disenfranch i~t'ment versus incidental burdens on voting that is
the• eriteria the majority so cavalierly ignores. Since the
case before us falls into the category of a complete dis-
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enfranchisement of a class of voters, the compelling state
interest test must be applied.
Just how far from the mark the majority opinion
strikes is evidenced by a review of this Court's voting
rights cases. We briefly reviewed that history in Dunn,
where we observed that:
"There is uo reason to repeat now the labors undertaken in earlier cases to analyze Lthe] right to vote
and to explain in detail the judicial role in reviewing
state statutes that selectively distribute the franchise. In decision, after decisiou, this C'ourt has
made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Evans,·. Corman , 398 l. S. 419, 421-422, 426
(1970); Kramer Y. Union Free School Di,strict, 395
U. S. 621, 626-628 ( 1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U. 8. 701, 706 ( 1969); Harper v. Board
of Elections, 383 e. S. 663, 667 ( 1966); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 93-94 (1965); Reynolds v.
Sims, supra.
"[Accordingly I, if a challenged statute grants the
right to vote to some citizens alld denies the franchise to others, ... the exclusions [must] be necessary to a compelling state interest." 405 U. S., at
336- 337.

onel

Cnfortunately, we did appear to be incorrect in
Oow~
rC'spect in Dunn-it seems that we must once again repea:_J 1
those "labors undertaken in earlier cases."
1n Reynolds v. Sil!ls , 377 U. S. 533, 564 (H)64), the
( 'ourt recognized that :
"[~Jince the right to exercise the franchise in a free
and unimpaired mauner is preservative of other basic
rivil and political rights. any alleged infringement of
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the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutiuized."
See also, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964);
Yick Wo \'. Hopki11s, 118 U. S. 356. 370 ( 1886). At its
next term, the Court invalidated a Texas statute disenfranchising servicemen stationed in that State. Carriugto11 v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). And in Harper Y.
Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 ( 1966), the Court
struck dow11 Virginia's poll tax as violative of equal
protection guarantee's. expressly recognizing that where
"fundanw11tal rights and liberties'' like voting are
involved. classifications which "restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined." 383 F. S.,
610.
In Kramer \'. Union Free School L>istrict, 395 U. S.
621 (H)6\J), the Court held unconstitutional a New York
statute denying thP right to vote in school district elections
to otherwise qualified votns who were 11either parents nor
property holders. I 11 doing so, the Court explicitly
equated the strict scrutiny test of Reynolds with the
compelling state interest test applied to classificatio11s
affecting fu ndamcn tal rights:

at

"LS j tate reapportionment statutes, which may dilute
the effectiveness of some citizen votes, receive
close scrutiny from this Court. Reynolds v. Sims,
supra . . . . ~o less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens
who are otherwise qualified by residence and age.
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a
selective basis always pose the danger of denying
some citizens any effective voice in the governmental
affairs which substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged State Statute grants the right
to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age
and citizenship and denies the franchise to others,
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the Court must determine whether the exclusions
arc necessary to promote a compelling State interest."
395 U.S., at 626-627. (Emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted. )
In a later case during the same term, the Court, in a
per curiam opinion, struck down a restriction of the
franchise in bond elections to "property taxpayers."
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 ( 1969). The
Court again explicitly applied the compelling state
interest test because a denial of the fundamental right
to vote was involved. Id. , at 704. And, in Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 309 e. 8. 204 ( 1970), the Court held that
an Arizo11a law limiting the franchise to r~al property
owners in elections to approve general obligation bonds
violated the Equal Protectio11 Clause. The Court relied
on its prior decisions in Kramer and Cipriano, supra. In
Evans v. Corman, 398 U.S. 4H) (1970), the Court also
applied a strict scruti 11y standard in striking down the
disenfranchisement of the residents of federal enclaves.
Finally, in Dunn, the Court explicitly reiterated that
because voting is a fundamental right, the compelling
state interest test of equal protection must be applied to
statutes which selectively distribute the franchise. 405
U. S., at 337. See also Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U. S.
U.S. 752, 763 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting); Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 519-520 (1973).
As the majority indicates, the compelling state interest
test is not applicable to every case involving an equal
protection challenge to electoral laws. But the line that
emerges from this Court's decisions clearly places a law,
such as that before us, which completely disenfranchises
a class of voters in the strict scrutiny category.
For example, in Rosario v, Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752,
the Court upheld a New York statute which required
''a voter to enroll in the party of his choice at least 30
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tiays before a general election in order to be eligible to
vote in the next party primary, and thus prevented ii
change in party affiliation during the approximately
11 months between the deadline and the primary elec~
tion.'' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973). The
Court to0k car@ to distinguish but reaffirm the cases in
which, wnlike Rosario "the state totally denied the fran"'
chise to a particular class of residents ... ," 410 U. S.,
at 757. The challenged provision in Rosario 1 was found
i10t to "disenfranchil"e the class to which the petitioners
belong .
Rather the statute merely imposed a time
deadline 011 thcir enrollment, which they had to meet in
order to participate in the next election ... ; The petitioners . . clC'arly could have ... enrolled in the party
of their choice before rthe deadline]." Ibid . Since petitioners had actually not been disenfranchised by the
challenged statute, the Court considered invocation of
the compelling state interest test inappropriate. Subsequently, the Court decided, in Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
r. S. 51 ( 107:3) , that an Illinois scheme which barred
a voter fro111 changing his party registration until he had
completely abstained from participating in one party
primary was constitutionally invalid. The Court applied
the strict scrutiny test in Kusper because, while
"[t]hc . .. statute at issue in Rosario did not prevent
voters from participating in the party primary of their
choice, it mnely imposed a time limit on enrollment .... "
Th<> statC' law !in Kusperl absolutely precluded participating iu the 1972 Democratic primary. Unlike the
petitioners in Rosario , whose disenfranchisement was
caused by their own failure to take timely measures, there
was no action that l the pC'titioner in Kusper] could have
takell to Jbej eligiblC' to vote in the ... primary." 414
U. S., at 60.
The same distinction between disenfranchisement,
which i11vokes strict scrutiny, and lesser incident.al

.
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burdens on the franchise, which do not, is demonstrated
by the Court's review of cases dealing with restrictions
on voting by persons incarcerated in state or local penal
institutions. In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 902 ( 1969), the Court affirmed a
decision upholding an Illinois statute which did uot
include certain inrnates of the Cook County jail in the class
of voters eligible for absentee balloting without applying
a strict scrutiny analysis. In a later case the court
explained that :
"The threshold questioll presented in McDonald was
'how stringeu t a standard to use in evaluating the
classifications made [by the Illinois absentee ballot
provisions] and whether the distinctions must be
justified by a compelling state interest . . . . ' 394
U. S., at 806. In resolving this question the Court
analyzed the Illinois scheme in light of our decisions
that required application of the more stringent compelling state interest test when . . . a fundamental
right, such as the right to vote, was allegedly
iufringed, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 ( 1964);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965)."
Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 519-520 (1973); see
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U S. 621,
626-627 11. 6 ( 1969) .
In McDonald, the compelling state in tereGt test was
in apposite because:
"[Tl here was 11othing in the record to indicate that
the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on
appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right
to vote. It is thus not the right to vote that is at
stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee
ballots." McDonald, 394 U. S., at 807, quoted at
Goosby, 409 U .. S., at 520.
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When faced with a statutory scheme which did, in fact,
deny incarcerated inmates the right to vote, the Court
struck it down in O'Brien v. Skinner, U. S. (1974).
U. S. (1974), the
Finally, Storer v. Brown, decision relied on by the majority, and its companion
U. S . .~
case, American Party of Texas v. White, (1974), also support the argument that an actual disw
enfranchisement can only be justified by a compelling
state interest. Storer concerned the right to be a candidate. In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972). the
Court carefully pointed out that the fundamental right
tel vote and the right to be a candidate are not synony~
mous, concluding that whether a barrier to candidacy
compelled strict scrutiny depended on the impact of the
restriction on the right to vote. In both Storer and its·
companion case, American Party of Texas v. White, ~
U. S. (1974h the Court applied the compelling state
interest test to the challenged candidacy requirements.
See Storer, supra, at A- (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 12
The conclusion is all but inescapable from our prior
decisions that a provision actually disenfranchising a
class of potential voters can only be sustained by a show~
ing that it satisfies the compelling state interest test.

III
To determine that the compelling state interest test
applies to the challenged classification is to settle only
the threshold question in this case. "Compelling state
interest" is merely a shorthand description of the difficult
process of balancing individual and state interests that
the Court must embark upon when faced vvith a classification touching on fundamental rights. Our other
12
See nbo Lubin v. Pamsh. U. S. candidacy 8ubjectcd to strict 8Crutiny).

(1974) (restriction on
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equal protection cases give content to the nature of that
balance. The State has the heavy burden of showing
first. that thr challenged disC'nfranchiscment, is necessary
to a compelling state interest; second. that the classification is drawn with precision-that it docs not exclude
too many people who should uot. and neNI not be exc1uded; and third. that there are no other reasonable
ways tu achieve the State's goal with a lesser burdeu on
the constitutionally protected interest. E. (/., Du1111 v.
Blumstein, 405 F. S. 330, 34;3, 360 ( H)7'2); Kramer v.
Union Free School District, 3~).5 U. ~- 6'.21. 632 ( H)6~);
~ee Rosario v. Hockefeller, 410 P. ~- 75'2 , 770 ( H)73)
(POWELL. J., dissenting); Cf. Memorial Hospital v. Mar1:.
copa ('9u11ty, - - U. S. ( 1974); i\.AACP \'. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelto11 v. Tucker, 364 U. S.
479,488 (1960).
I am persuaded that the State has uot met its burden
of justifying the blanket disenfranchisement of former
felons prese11 ted in this case. There is certainly no basis
for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in the
democratic process than any other citizen. Like everyone else, their daily lives arc deeply affected and changed
by the decisions of government. See Kramer, supra, at
627. As the Secretary of the State of California observed in his memorandum to the Court in support of
respondents '.in this case:

"It is doubtful ... whether the state can demonstrate either a compelling or rational policy interest
in denying former felons the right to vote. The
individuals involved in the pres0nt case are persons
who have fully paid their debt to society. They are
as much affected by the actions of government as
any other citizens, alld have as much right to participate in governmental decision-making. Further~
more, the denial of the right to vote to such persons

~
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is a hindrance to the efforts of society to rehabilitate
former felons and convert them into law abiding
and productive citizens." 13
Nonetheless, the Court today finds the disenfranchisement of ex-felons constitutionally valid on the basis of
what has been aptly described as "a quasi~1netaphysical
invocation that the [state's compelling] interest is preservation of the 'purity of the ballot box.' E. g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 ( 1884), the venerable sire of
abundant progeny; cf. Kronlund v. Hunstei'11, 327 F.
Supp. 73, 73 (ND Ga. 1971)." Dillenberg v. Kramer,
469 F. 2d 1222, 1224-1225 ( 1972). The Court's ~ i monious invocation of the State's interest iu the 'purity
of the ballot box, encompasses two more specific and
interrelated but 110 more convincing elements. First, the
mapority asserts that the disenfranchising of former felons is necessary to prevent voting frauds. The majority
intimates that because "it is ... not beyond dispute''
that the challenged provisions are related to preventing
electoral fraud, the State has satisfied its heavy burden
of justification. Such a meager showing, however, ,vould
not even satisfy the lower-tier rational relation test of
equal protection analysis. See Johnson v. Robison, U. S. ca "fair and substantial" relation is required);
Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528. (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
Although the State has a legitimate and, in fact ,
compelling interest in preventing vote fraud, the challenged provision is not sustainable on that ground.
First, the disenfranchisement provisions are patently
over- and under-inclusive. The provision is not limited
to those who have demonstrated a marked propensity for
13
Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in opposition to certiorari , Ramirez v. Richardson, No . 73-324 .
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abusing the ballot by violating election laws. Rather,
it encompasses all former felons. And, those convicted of
violating election laws, which are only misdemeanors,
are not barred from voting at all. There has been no
showing that ex-felons generally are any more likely to
abuse the ballot than the remainder of the population.
See Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F. 2d 1222, 1225 (CA9
1973). It seems clear that the classificatiou here is not
tailored to achieve its articulated goal, since it crudely
excludess large numbers of otherwise qualified voters.
See Kramer, supra, at 632; Ciprano, supra, at 706.
Moreover, there are clear1y means available for the
State to prevent voting fraud which are far less burdensome on the constitutionally protected right to vote. As
we said in Dunn, supra, at 353, the "State has at its
disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than
adequate to detect alld deter whatever fraud may be
feared." Cf. Harman v. Forsse11ius, 380 U. S. 528, 543
(1965); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164 (1939).
The California court's description of the complex and
complete catalogue of penal sanctions for election frauds
surely demonstrates there are adequate alternatives to
disen fran chisem ent.
"Today . . the Elections Code punishes at least 76
different acts as felonies, in 33 separate sections; at
least 60 additional acts are punished as misdemeanors, in 40 separate sectious; and 14 more acts
are declared to be felony misdemeanors. Among
this plethora of offenses we take particular note, in
the present connection of the felony sanctions
against fraudulent registrations ( § 220), buying and
selling of votes ( §§ 12000- 12008), intimidating
voters by threat or bribery (§§ 29130-29135), voting
twice, or fraudulently voting without being entitled
to do so, or impersonating another voter ( § § 14403,
29430-29431) , fraud or forgery in casting absentee

•J
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ballots (§§ 14690-14692), tampering with voting
machines (~ 15280), or ballot boxes (§~ 1709017092), forging or altering'electi6n returns ( ~ § .2910029103), and so i1-1terferi-ng· with the offices holding
an election 6r conel.ucting· a --ca1wass, -0t with t~
voters lawfolly -exercising their rights of voting a,t
an 8-lection, as to prevent the election or canvass
frotn being fairly held and lawfully conducted.
-~§ 17093) (Footnotes omitted)." Ramirez v. Brown,
9 Cal. 3d 199, 215-216 ( 1973).
Given the panoply of criminal offenses to deter and
punish electoral misconduct, as well as the statutory
reforms and technological changes which have transformed the electoral process in the last century, the kind
of election fraud feared by the majority is no longer even
a serious danger,'' and disenfranchisement can hardly be
said to be necessri,ry to its prevention.
The second purpose asserted by the majority is to keep
former felons from voting because "their likely voti1:!_g
pattern might be subversive of the interests of any
ordered society," ante, at - . In support of the argument that electors can be kept from the ballot box for
fear they might vote to repeal or emasculate provisions
of the criminal code, the majority relies on this Court's
decisions in Murphy v. Rcunsey, 114 U. S.15 (1885), and
Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 ( 1890). In Murphy, this
Court upheld the disenfranchisement of anyone who had
ever entered into a bigamous or polygamous marriage
and in Davis, the Court sanctioned as a condition to the
franchise the requirement of an oath that the elector
did not "teach, advise counsel or encourage any person
to commit the crime of bigamy or poligamy." The
Court's intent was clear-"to withdraw all political influence from those who are practically hostile to" the goals
11

Richardsun v Ramirez, 9 Cal , 3d 199 214 (1973) .
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of certain criminal laws. Murphy, supra, at 45; Dav-is,
S'Upra, at 348.
To the extent Murphy and Davis represent the doc~
trine that citizens can be barred from the ballot box
because they would vote to change the then extant
criminal law, those decisions arc surely derelicts on the
sea of the lav,· which are long srnce in need of scuttlin ·.
e have repeater ly el that such "differences of opinion
may 11ot be a basis for excluding any group or person from
the franchise," Cipriano v. Cily of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
705-706 ( 196$i) ; see Communist Party of Indiana v.
Whitcomb, - - P. 8. (1D73); Evans v. Corman, 380
U. S. 419, 423 ( HJ70J.
" [ I j f they are residents, they as all other qualified
residents have a right to an equal opportunity for
political represe11tation . . . . 'Fencing out' from
the franchise a sector of the population because of
the way they may vote, is constitutionally impermissible. " Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. ~- 80, 94
(1965); see Du1111 , supra, 405 U. S., at 355.
Although, in the last century, this Court may have
j ustifiect the exclusion of votPrs from the electoral process
for fear that they would vote to change laws considered
important by a temporal majority, I am persuaded that
we would not countenance such a purpose today. The
process of democracy is one of change. Our laws are
not frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in
the process of revision- in response to the needs of a
changing society. The public interest as conceived by
a majority of the voting public is constantly un<lergoing
re-examination. Not even the Constitution is immune
from transformations in interpretation and application .
See, e.g., Harp er v. Virgi11ia Board of Elections, 383 U. S,
663, 669-670 ( 1966). The Court's holding in Davis,
8Upra, a11d Murphy , supra, that a State may disenfran-
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chise a class of voters to "withdraw all political influence
from those practically hostile" to the extant order,
strikes at the very heart of the democratic process. A
temporal majority could use such a power to preserve
inviolate its view of the social order simply by disenfranchising those with different views. Voters who opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised those who advocated repeal "to prevent persons
from being enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal
laws of the country." Davis, supra, 133 U. S., at 348.
Today, presumably those who disfavored the Viet Nam
War or supported the legalization of marihuana could
be barred from the ballot box for much the same reason.
The ballot is the democratic system's coin of the realm.
To condition its exercise on support of the established
order is to debase that currency beyond recognition.
Rather tha11 resurrect the language of Dav-is and Mitrphy,
I would expressly disavow any continued adherence to
the dangerous notions there~n .express°:1·. T?e ·
] lu D= ( /l,i,i ~
. . bankruptcy of the maJonty's pos1t10n 1s betrayed
~ Jll,01- .fo ~
by the fact that it resorts to a theme of childhood fiction o-(/- ,' t,Jl- t!f> ~ .
1
by "conjuring up the specter of a colony of thieves." µ,uz !}
Ante, at rn. Suffice it to say that a "colony of thieves"
is hardly more than a "theoretically imaginable concern ,''
hence clearly inadequate to justify a deprivation of fundamental rights. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 33
(1968).
Those public purposes so avidly asserted by the majority seem to have been found wanting in many quarters.
When this suit was filed, 22 States allowed ex-felons full
access to the ballot. Since that time, four more States
have joined their ranks.' " Shortly after federal courts
15

The following State~ did not permanently di~enfranchise former
frlon8: Arkan~n:,;, Ark . Stat. Ann. § 3-707 (Supp . 1971); Colorado,
Colo. Cou~t., Art . VII;§ 10, nnd Colo. H('V. Stat. Ann. §49-3-2 (1)
(Perm. Cum. Sup. 1971) ; Florida, Flu . Stal. Ann. § 940.05 (1973);
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sustained New York's and Florida's disenfranchisement
provisions. the legislatures repealed those laws.,.. Congress has recently provided for the restoration of felo11s;
Hawaii, Hawaii Con~I ., Ari. II, § 2 and Hawaii Hev. Stat. § 716-2
(Su])ll. 1971); Illino1,,;, Ill. Com,t., Art. 3. § 2 and Ill. Ann. Stat., r. 46,
§ 3-5. 19A-5 (Smith-Hurd Sup. 1972); Indinnn. Ind. Stat. Ann.
§ 29-480--1; Kan~n,-;. K:rn. Stal. Ann. 22-3722; :'.\I:tint', Me. Con81.,
Art. II, § l; '.\Ja:,;.~arh118etts, Ma8:i. Gen. Laws, r. 51, § 1, IA; Michi•
gan, Mich. L1w1,( Ann.§ 1G8.l0; Minnesota. ".\1iun. Stat.§ 609.165 (1)
(1964); ~fi,-,-olln, ;\lo. Hrv. Stat. § 2lfi.35/i (3); Ne\V .irr8ry. X ..J.
Hev. Stal. Ann. § 19.4-1 (Supp . 197:2-J9n); NPbrn~ka, Krb . HPv .
Stat. § 8:3-1, l l8 (4) (1971); New I-lamp8ltir<', N. II. Hev. Stat .
§ 607-A (Slipp. 1D7:2}, Ohio, Ohio HPv. Codr Ann .. § 29fi7.16 (Supp .
197:2) ; Orc•gon, Or<'. Hrv. S1nt~. §§ 1:37.240, 137.250 (1969 HrphteP~
mrnt); Pe1rn~:,·lvn11ia, P:1. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, § G2:3-2 (k), 951-2.
2o02 :111d Tit. 10, § K9:3 , South Dakota, S. D. Codr §§ 24-5-2 nm!
2:3-57-7 (19fi7), VPnnont, Vt. Con:-;t., r. I , Art. 8 and r. II, §:32 ;
Wr8t \'irginia. W. \'a. Code,§ :3-1-a nnd 51 Op. W. Va. Alt. 4 (kn .
182 (19fi.'i); Wi"con:-;i11, Wi:-;. Stat. Ann.§ 57-078 (Supp 1972-197::n;
Wyoming , Wyo . Stal. Ann. § 7- :311 (H)57).
In 1972 :'.\Iontann nmendrd it~ ron:-;titution to di~cnfrnnchi1:-P potmtial rlrclor~ on]~, while "~(·n·iug n ;:(')]trner for a fc-1011~·." l\lont.
Const., Ari. IV , § 2. In 197:3, X<•,,· York :unendC'd it~ law~ to allow
formrr frlon~ whosl' ::;c•ntc•n,·p had rxpirrd or who wrrr rl'IC'a::;Pd from
parole to rntc•. 17 ;'\p\r York Elrrtion Law~, § 152 (:\lrKinnry
Supp. 1972-197:3) . Al:-:o in H)7:3, North Carolina arnenckd i1,, law:-:
to rl'~tori' all civil right~ i11('lt1ding tlH' franehi"r lo former felon8
di::;rh11rged from Jlrti<Oll or pnrolr. N. C. C:rn. St111. § 1:3- 1. And. in
the ~amr yrar, tlw Tc•rn1<'~>'<'<' IPg;i"l11t11n• anwndrd its rx-frlon di8c•nfr:111ehi8C'ltlrnl ~tat ut r:-;. Sl'C' Trnn. Code Ann. § 2-205.
111 The N rw York rx-frlon di~enfr11nchi,rmrnt provi1:-ion w11s upheld
in Green\'. Board of Elffti011s of thl' City of Neu• York, :380 F. 2d
445 (CA2 19fi7). and ~horlly th('rraftcr tlw Nrw York i(>gi~laturp
rrpcalPd that law. N. Y. EIPrtion Law § 152 (:\IrKinnry Supp .
1972-197:3). Similarly tlw Florida di~enfranrhi::;Pment 11rovi;;ions
wrrr upheld in Bearhmn v. Bratennan. :300 F. Supp. 1048 (SD Fla.
1968), aff'd llH'm., ;l!)(i U. S. 12 (1909). Sub::;rqurntly, Florida
i:-;tatutr::; wrrr 11mr•1JC!rd to provide for thr automatic rr8tor:ition of
all civil rig;hti;, in<'luding the franchise upon thr rompletion of
srntrner or rrlca:-;(' from parole or proba1iou . Fla Stat. Ann ,
§ 940.0.5 (197:3) .
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voting rights at the end of sentence or parole in the
District of Columbia. 21 D. C. Code~ 1-1102 (7). The
K ational Conference on Uniform State Laws," the
American Law Institute," The National Probation and
Parole Association,"' The National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals/ 0 the PresiJent's Commiss1011 on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice/ 1 the California League of Wo111e1i
Voters,"" the Kational Democratic Party?1 and the
Secretary of State of California "1 have all strongly
e11dors(•d fu 11 rnff rage rights for former felons.
The ma,iodty notes that the disenfranchisement of
ex-felons i11 a statP policy that reaches far back i11 our
Xation:il Confen•11C·r on Uniform Stat(· Law:;, l1niform Aet 011
tlw Rtat11, of Coll\·ictPd PPr,on,, § '.2-:1 (19ti5) .
1~ AmNic:au Law ln~tit11tr, i\lodPl P<'lliti Code• § :m6.:l.
1
" Natiowd l'rnlrntion and ParolP A~~oc-ia1ion, Standard Probntiott
and Pnrolt' Ac-t, §§ 1:2 :rnd '.27 (1955) .
" 11 :'\ationnl .\dvi,or~· C'o111mi,~ion on Crimi11nl .lu,ticl' Stall(larcb
a n<l Uoal,, lfrport 011 C'onwt ion,, Standard l (l.17 ( HJ,:J) . TIH'
HPport ob~<·r,·Pd I h:11 :
"Lo,~ of ci1izPnl-'hip-l 111<·l11dingj thr right to rnte . .. - inhibit,
r<'i'ormatin' rffort,. If <·Drn·c·tion~ i" to rc•intrgrnk an off<'nder i1110
;-;oc-ict~·. tlH' offrndrr mu~t rrtain all attributr.~ of c-itizrn~h1p. lll
addition hi~ rrspret for law and tbe legnl ~~·~t em ma~· wrll dc·pt>ncl,
in somr nwa~urc,, on hi~ al.Jility to partieip11te in that :::~·:,tPm .
:vlnndatory tlc-nial~ ~ervc' 110 lrgitimate public· int('!'e~t." Id., at 59:~.
21
Prr~idrn1 ':; Commi"~ion on Law Enforcement and t'lw Admini:,t rntio11 of Ju:::tier, Task Farer HPport: Corrrct iou~ , 90 (19(l7):
"Tlwre ,ePm~ no ju,;tifieatio11 for 1wrmanrntly depriving all ronvicted felons of thr vote- . . . . [T]o bl' drpriVPd of tlw right to
reprnsrntation in a drmocrnt 1e :,oeirt~· i~ :111 importan1 symbol ...•
!\JorPovN, n'hnl.Jilita1ion mia;ht l.Je furthrred by rneouraging ron.victPd 1wr~ons to pnrticipa1(' in ~oc-iety by C'Xrrci~ing the vote."
2
i California Lragur of Womrn's Voter~ , Polley StHtrmPnt, FPb.
ruary rn, 1972.
2
~ National ])<'rnocrntic !'art)·, Party Platform 1972.
24
1\Irrnoraudum of tlw St•nrlar~· of Stair of California in Opposition to certiorari in Rirhorcl~on v. Ramirez, No. 73-824,
17
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history a11d which has received support in the dicta of
this Court. Dicta is. of course, not precedent and "constitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutable frozeu like insects trapped in Devonian amber."
Dillenburg v. Krarner, 469 F. 2d 1222, 1226 (1972). The
majority notes that several States had dise11franchise~
mellt laws at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but:
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to
the political history of a particular era. In determining what hnvs are constitutionally diserimina~
tory, we have never been confined to the historic
1lotions of equality anymore tha11 we have restricted
dur process to a fixed catalog of what was at a given
time deemed to br the limits of fundamental rights."
Harper v. Board of Elections, 283 U. S. 663, 669
(1966).
The majority also relics on the fact that this Court has
affirmed without opinion the decisions of three-judge
district courts upholding disenfrauchisement provisions/''
But, as MR. JvsTICE REHNQUIS'l' has only recently
reminded us, summary affirmances are obviously 11ot of
the same precedential value as would be an opinion of
this Court treating the question on the merits. Edelman
v. Jordan, - lT. S. - , (1974). 20
The disenfranchisement of felons had "its ongms in
the fogs and fictions of federal jurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern statutes
without fully realizing either the effect of its literal sig2

" Pinchet ,·. Scott, 35:2 F. Supp. 117 (MDNC 1972), nff'd mem.,
411 U. S. 961 (197a); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. S. 182 (SD
Fla.), aff'd mc>m., 39H U. S (1069) .
20
Ser Frankfurtrr and La11cli~ , The B11si11C'8;; of the Supreme Court
at October Trrm-19:29 , -14 Harv. L. Hev. 1, 14 (1930).
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11ingance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit
of our system of government." Byers v. Sun Savinys
Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731, 139 P, 948, 949 (1914). I think
it clear that measured against the standards of this
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, the blanket dis~
enfranchisement of ex-felons cannot sta11d.

IV
The majority also relies on § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as au express authorization for the States
to disenfranchise former felons, Section 2 does except
disenfranchisement for "participation in rebellion, or
other crime" from the operation of its penalty provision ,
There is no independent legislative history to the crucial
words "or other crime"; the proposed § 2 went to a joint
committee containing only the phrase "participation in
rebellion '' ancl emerged with "or other crime" inexplicably
tacked 011.n
The historical purpose for § 2 itself is relatively clear.
The Republicans who controlled the 39th Congress were
concerned that the additional congressional representation of tho Southern States which would result from the
abolition of slavery might weaken their own political
dominance!' There were two alternatives availableeither to limit southern represe11tatio11, which was
27

See, f' , (!., Notr Rc~toring the Ex-oITenc!Pr'~ Right to Votp: Background and Drvelopment8, 11 Am , Crim , L, Rrv. 721 , 746-747 11.
158 (1973) .
8
" Bonfirld , Thr Hight to \ 'ote and ,Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of thr Fourtrenth Amcndmrnt, 46 Corn. L. Q. 108, 109
(1960); Flark, The Adoption of the .Fourteenth Am('nclmmt 98,
126 (1908) ; KPnclrick, .Joumal of the Joint Committre of .Fifteen
on Recon8truction 290-2f)l ; ,Jame8, Thr .Framing of thr .Fonrternth
Amendment (HJ56) ; Yan Alstyne, The .Fourteenth Ame11dment , 'ThP
Right to Vote,' and the llnderstancling of the 89th Congrr:,;.~, 1965
Sup. Ct. Rev . ;3:{, 44.
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unacceptable on a long-term basis/" or to insure that
southern Negroes, sympathetic to the Republican cause,
would be e11frauchised, but an explicit grant of suffrage
to Negroes was thought politically unpalatable at the
time.a" Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
resultant compromise. It put Southern States to a
choice-enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional
representation. :n
The political motivation of ~ 2 had little to do with
the purpose for rest of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
one noted commentator explained:
"It became part of the Fourteenth Amendment
largely through the accident of political exigency
rather than through the relation which it bore to
the other Sections of the Amendment;,_... It seems
quite impossible to co11clude that there was a clear
anrl deliberate understanding in the House that § 2
expressly recognizerl the States' power to deny or
abridge the right to vote." 33
Th us it is clear that § 2 was not inte11ded and does
i1ot snve as a limitation on the other sections of the
14th Amendnwnt. · For example, § 2 excepts from its
tcnrn,. denial of the franchise not only to ex-felons but
also to perso11s under 21 years of age. In Oregon v.
Mitch ell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), this Court held that the
Congr<'SS under § 5, had the power to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment by lowering the voting age to
18 in federal elections. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN there
2

"

.f:tmr,-, n. 2b, supra, ,it 138- 1;39.
n. 28, supra, at 291 ; rf. Flack, n . 28, supra, at 111,.

au Kendrick,

118.
a, BcmfiPl<l, n. 28, supra, at 111 ; James , n. 28, supra, ai 185 ;
Va11 Alstyne , n. 28, supra, at 43-'-IA-, 58, 65.
a; Van Alstyne, 11. 28, supra, at 4a-44.
aa Id ., at 65.
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observed, ~ 2 was intended as no more "than a remedy
supplementary, aud in somP conceivable circumstances
indispensable to other Congressional and j uclicial remedies
available under ~ections I and V." Id., at 152. ln § 2,
Congress provided a specific remedy fot' disenfranchisement of a particular class of voters. Congress did not,
by implication. a..pprove all other elections discriminations
to which that remedy was not applicable. Hence § 2
should not insulate the insta11t disenfranchisement from
equal protection !Scrutiny. Cf. Shapiro v. 'l-ihompson,
394 U. S. 618, 638-639 (1969).
To say that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
a direct limitation on the protection afforded voting
rights by § 1 might well lead to absurd results. lf
one accepts the premise that § 2 authorizes disenfranchisement for any crime. the challengecl California prov1s1011 could require disenfranchisement for seduction
u 11der promise of marriage, or couspiracy to operate a
motor vehicle without a muffler."' Disenfranchisement
in other ::-;tates extends to convictions for vagrancy or
breaki1}g a water pipe,"'' to 11ote but two examples. Even
a jaywalking or traffic conviction could conceivably lead
ot, dis0nfra1ichisement, since § 2 does not differentiate
brtwc>('ll felonies and misdemeanors.
To the extent that ~ 2 is to be viewed as a limitation
on the protections of the right to vote afforded by § 1
of tlw Fourteenth Amendment, then I believe the words
"or othrr crimes" should be narrowly construed to reflect
their limited historical purpose. Giveu the lack of any
i11depe11dent legislative history for the phrase "or other
:ll 8<·<· Ot~uka , . !lite, 04 Cat. 2d 59G, 414 P. 2<l 412, 51 Cat.
Hpir 21'i,.J. (19Gfi).
"" \'ng;rn11c·.1· i" a di"'enfrn11ehi"ing offrnse in Alabama and brraking
a wai<'r pipr in North Dnkota . Note, Di:senfranchisement of Exfrlou,- : A Rea,;:;essmrnt , 25 Stan . L . Hev . 845, 846-847 (1973) .
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crime," could have been intended to cover only crimes
related to the rebellion. There are significant indications that "participation in rebellion, or other crimes"
was added to the amendment so that border States which
had disenfranchised large numbers of ex-rebels would
not suffer a loss of congressional representation as a
result."" The "other crimes" language may have been
intended merely to validate the disenfranchisement of
ex-rebels whose participation in the Confederate cause
may not have been technically encompassed by the
phrase "participation in rebellion."

V
I would hold the disellfranchisemeut of former felons
who had fully served their sentences or been discharged
from parole or probation and had not been convicted of
electoral crimes to be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. But since this case is. in my view moot., I would
never reach that question. Rather, I would remand
the case for reconsideration by the Supreme Court of
Califo "'·

z

lue.M . . --

:rn Kc'll(lrirk, n. 28, supra, at 22:3; Brief of the American Bar
A:osn. as amicus rnriae, at pp. 16-20.
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Court.
The three individual r<'spondents in this case were
convicted of felonies and have complctrd the service of
their respective se11te11ces a11d paroles. They filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of
California to compel California county elC'ction officials
to register them as voters. 1 They claimed, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situatC'd, that application to them of the provisions of the California Constitution and implementing statutes which disenfranchised
persons convicted of an "infamous crime" cle11ied them
the right to C'qual protection of the lavvs under the Ferieral Constitution. The SuprC'rnc Court of California held
that "as applied to all ex-felons whose terms of iucarcer1

The peti1 ion for a writ. of mandate in thP Supr0mr Court of
California ::il~o n::im0d t br Californin Secrrt1H)' of StntC' n" n r0sponclent in his rapacitr of chirf elt-e1ions officer of the S1at0 of C::ilif'ornia.
He did not join 1hr peti1 ion for a writ of certiorari to this Court,
and has filed rt briC'f as a party r0spondrnt. Re~pondrnt;: hPrc
(petitioners brlow) nlso include, in ::iddifion lo the three imlividual
respondents, 1hr LPngu0 of ·wornm Yof er, 11 nd th rec non profit organization~ whirh ~upport th<' interest~ of rxronviets-Los Pintos, 7th
Step FoundationH, Jnr. (California Affiliate~), and Prisoner,,' Union.

~
~ WLVv~~

·-t. ~ /
¥/3
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ation and parole have expired, the provisions of Article
II and Article XX, section 11. of the California Constitution denying the right of suffrage to persons couvicted
of crime, together with the several sections of the Elections Code implementing that disqualification ... , violate the equal protection clause oft-he Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Cal. 3d 199. We granted certiorari, U. S.
Article XX, section 11. of the California C'onstitutio11
has provided since its adoption i11 1879 that "laws shall be
made" to exclude from voting perso ns con vir,tNI of bribery, perjury, forgery , malfeasance in office, "or other
high crimes." At the time respondents ,rere refused
registration , former Art. II , § 1 of the California Constitution provided in part that "no alie11 ineligible to
citizenship, no idiot. no i11sane perc.on, no person eonvicted of any infamous crime, no person herc·after convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public
money. and no person who shall not be able to read the
Constitution in the English language and write, his or
her name, shall riever exercise the privileges of an elector
in this state.'' ~ Sections :no and 321 of the California
Elections Code provide th at an affidavit of rc'gistra tion
shall show whether the afliaut has been convicted of "a
Propo~ition i, p:1~,-rd n1 tlw Xovl·mlwr 7, 1972, gl'J1l'n1l rkcfion,
rrpeEtlrcl formc·r Ar1. II. § 1, of fhr Californin Con~1i1111ion :1nd
nddrd nrw Ar1. II, § ~:
"The Lrgi~ln1mr ~hall prohibit improprr prar1 ice,- thn1 nffrrt Plrr1ions nncl ~!mil proYidr th:11 no ~,·,·Pr<'l~- mc·ntall~· rPtnrdrd 1wr,:on,
in~ane 1wr,:on. prr,-on convic1rd of 1111 inf:1111011,- erinw , nor JH'r,:on
convie1rd of rmbezzlrmrnt or mi~appropriation of p11hlie monc-y,
shall exerci~r 1hr priYilegr of an Pie!'( or in thi,: ,:(ate."
The Suprrmr C'o11r1 of G1lifornia comlmlcd thn1 thr IH'I\" r·on,:fitutional pro,·i~ion w/l,: no diffrrenf i11 ,:11bH1a 1wr from the fornwr onr,
nnd that it did nof impliri11~· rPprnl tlw implemenfing ~rrtiou,-; of
the Californin Elrction~ Code rhnllcnged here,
2
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felony which disqualifies him from voting." 3 Sections
383, 389, and 390 direct the county clerk to cancel the
registration of all voters who have been convicted of
"any infamous crime or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of any public money." 4 Sections 14240 and
14246 permit a voter's qualifications to be challenged on
the ground that he has been convicted of "a felony" or
of "the embezzlement or misappropriation of public
8 Section 310 of the California Elections Code provides in relevant
part that "the affidavit of registration shall ,:how : .. . (h) That
affiant is not disqu::llified to vote by reasou of a felony conviction ."
Section 321 sets the form of the registration affidavit, which includes
the following: "10. I am not disqunlified to vote by rem;on of lt
felony conviction."
4
Section 383 of the California Elections Code provides :
<'The county clerk shall cancel the registration in the followiug
cases: ... Upon the production of a certified copy of a subsisting
Judgment of the conviction of the person registered of any infamous
crime or of the embezzlement or misapproprintion of any public
money.. . ."
Section 389 provides:
HThe county clerk shall, in the first week of September in each year,
examine the records of the courts having jurisdiction in case of
infamous crimes and the embezzlement or misappropriation of
public money, and shall cancel the affidavit;, of rrgistration of all
voters who have been finally convicted of an infamous crime or of
the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money.. .."
Section 390 provides:
'-'The county clerk, on the basi;, of the records of courts in the
county having jurisdiction of such offenses, shall furnish to the
registrar of voters in a county where there is a registrar of voters,
before the first dny of September of each year, a statement showing·
the names of all persons convicted of infamous crimes or of the
embezzlement or miHnppropriation of public money during the year·
prior to that first day of September, whose convictions have become
final. The registrnr of voters shall, during the first week of September in each year, cancel the affidavits of registration of such persons.
The county clerk ~hall cei:tify the statement under the seal of his
Qfjioe•. •. • t·
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money." 5 California provides by statute for restoration
of the right to vote to persons convicted of crime either
by court order after the completion of probation/ or, if
a prison term was served, by executive pardon after
completion of rehabilitation proceedings.7 California
5

Section 14240 of the California Elections Code provides:

"A person offering to vote may be orally chnllengrd within the
polling place on]~, by a member of 1he precinct board upon any or
all of the following grounds: ... That he ha~ been convict rd of a
felony. . . . On the day of the elertion no prr~on, other than a
member of a precinct board or other official rrspo11~ihlr for the
conduct of 1hr rlection, Hhall clrnllengc any voter or qur~tion hirn
concerning his qualifications to vote. . .."
Section 14246 provides :
"If the challenge is on the ground that ihc person challengl'd ha~
been convicted of a frlony or that he ha~ bern <'onvictecl of thP
embezzlement or misappropriation of public monry , he shall not
be questioned, but the fact mn~· br proved by the prod11etion of an
authenticated copy of the record or by the sworn oral testimony of
two witnesses . . . . ''
6 Section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code provides :
"(a) In an? case in which a defendant has fulfilled thr ronditionb
of probation for the entire prriod of probation, or has hPen discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in
any other case in which a court, in its di~cret ion and the intem,ts
of justice, determine~ that a defendant should be granted the relief
available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time after
the termination of the period of probntion, if he is not then servmg
a sentence for any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged
with the commis,:;ion of an~' offen~e, be permitted by the court to
withdraw his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere nnd entrr a
plea of not guilty; or, if he ha,:; bren convicted after a plra of not
guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guihy; and, in either
case, the court shall there11pon dismiss the accusation::< or information
against the defendant and he 8hall thereafter be relrased from all
penalties and disabilities re811lting from the offense of which hr has
been convicted. The probationer shall be informed of thi,:; right and
privilege in his probation papCI'8 . . . . "
7
Section 4852.01 of the California Penal Code provides ihal a
person convicted of a felony who was incarcerated may file , any tim<1
'
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also provides a procedure by which a person refused
i'egistration may obtain judicial review of his
disqualification. 8
after his release from custody, a notice 'of intention to apply for
a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. It further provides,
however:
"This chapter shall not apply to persons convicted of misdemeanors;
to persons who have served time in county jails only; to persons
serving a mandatory life parole; to persons committed under death
sentences; or to persons in thr military service."
Section 4852.13 of the California Penal Code provides :

"If, after hearing, the court finds that the petitioner has demon•
strated by his course of conduct his rehabilitation and his fitness
to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship, the
court shall make an order declaring that the petitioner has been
rehabilitated, and recommending that the Governor grant a full
pardon to the petitioner. Such order shall be filed with the clerk
of the court, and shall be known as a certificate of rehabilitation.
The certificate shall show the date on which the original notice of
intention to apply for a certificate was filed."
Section 4852.16 provides.
"The certified copy of a certificate of rehabilitation transmitted to
the Governor shall constitute an application for a full pardon upon
receipt of which the Governor may, without any further investigation, issue a pardon to the person named therein, except that, pursuant to Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution, the Governor
shall not grant a pardon to any person twice convicted of felony,
except upon the written recommendation of a majority of the judgr,s
of the Supreme Court."
Section 4852.17 provides:
" •. . Whenever a person is granted a full and unconditional pardon
by the Governor, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation, the
pardon shall entitle the person to exercise thereafter all civil and
political rights of citizenship, including but not limited to: (1) the
right to vote .. . ."
8
Section 350 of the California Elections Code provides:
"If the county clerk refuses to register any qualified elector in i ha
county, the elector may proceed by action in the superior court to
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Each of the individual respondents was convicted of
o 1e or more felomes, and served some time m .1a11 or
prison followe
y a successfully terminated parole,.
Respondent Ramirez was convicted in Texas; respondents Lee and Gill were convicted in California. When
Uamirez applied to register to vote in San Luis Obispo
6ounty, the County Clerk refused to allow him to register. The Monterey County Clerk refused registrati011 to
respondent Lee, and the Stanislaus County Registrar of
Voters refused registration to respondent Gill. All three
respondents were refused fPgistratiOJJ because of theiJ'
felony convictions.n
Jn May 1972 respondents filed a petition for a writ,
of mandate in the Supreme Court of California, invoking
~cimpel hi~ regii:ltration In an action umh-r thi~ · ;-;rHion. a,- many
pen,ons may join a:,; plaintiff,., a::; have rau~es of artion ."
Respondent::: contc•mlPcl that pardon wn,; not an effret1w de\'ice
f.or obtaining the frnnehioe, noting thnt during 196~1971, :34,21i2
person;; wNe rrlra"i>cl from state pri;-;011:-1 an<l while onl) 282 pardon,-.
,~erc- grantrd .
9 'Rc:,;pondrnt Tiamirez was eonvicted in Trxa;, of the felon~ of
"robbery by a~"ault '' in 1952. He ,;erved three month~ in jail and
slicressfully termina trd hie Jl:t role in 19132 . In Frbruary 197'.Z the
San Luiz Obispo County CIPrk refu,-c•d to allow Ramirrz to reg1:-<t<'r
to vote on the ground that hr had lH'rn ('OllVll'ied of a fl'lo1i~· :1nd
sprnt tinw in inrarcrmtion. nr"pondrnt Lc-r ,rn~ ronv1rted of the
felony of hrroin po;;;;rs,-ion m California in H)55, ,;rrvPd two year~
in pri8on, and sucre~:::fully tPrminatrd hi;; parolr in 1959. In MarC'h
1972 thr Monter<'Y Couuty Clrrk refusrd to allow Ler to rrgi,-tc'r
to vote on tlw sole ground that hr had hren ronvi('trcl of a felony
and had not bPrn pardonrd by thr Governor . Rr:;pon<knt Gill
was ronvirted in 1952 and HJ67 of :sc-cond degree burglary in California, and in 1957 of forgPry Hr servrcl some t nnp in 1m:-on on
each conviction, followPd br a ::;ncerssful p:1rolr. In April 1972 th r
Stani"laus County Regi;;trar of vo1Pr:-< refii"e(( to allow Gill to
fegister to vote on the solP gr01111d of Iii::; prior felo11 y eonv1rt10u",

' J.
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· its original jurisdiction. 10 They named as defendants 11
· below the three election officials of San Luis Obispo,
Monterey, and Stanislaus Counties who had refused to
. allow them to register, "individually and as representatives of the class of all other County Clerks and Registrars of Voters who have the duty of determining for
their respective counties whether any ex-felon will be
denied the right to vote." The petition for a writ of
mandate challenged the constitutionality of respondents'
exclusion from the voting rolls on two grounds. First
it was contended that California's denial of the franchise
·to the class of · ex-felons could no longer withstand
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four'teenth 'Arrten'dment. Relying on the Court's recent voting rights cases, respondents argued that a compelling
state interest must be found to justify exclusiou of a
class from the franchise, and that California could assert
no such interest with respect to ex-felons. Second, respondents contended that application of the challenged
California constitutional and statutory provisions by election officials of the State's 58 counties was so lacking in
1 ~'Paragraph VI of re:,;pondents petition for mandnun1~ st ates that
the named "Petitioner~ bring this action individually and 011 hehalf
of all ofher persons who are ineligible to register to vote in California
solely by reason of a convirtion of a felony other than an election
code felony." The remninder of the petition makrs it clear that the
class was further restricted to ex-felons, and the Supreme Court of
'California so treated it.
11
We refer to the named "defendants" in the action in the Supreme
'Court of California, even though in that court they were actually
denominated respondents according to California practice, and we
refer to named "plaintjffs" in that comt, even thongh they were
~ctually there denominated as plaintiffs. We do this for convrnience
of reference, in order to avoid ar:: rnmh a:,; possible confusion between
reference to the position of the parties in the Supreme Coul't of
California and their position here.

,"',.
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uniformity as to itself deny them due process and ''ge<J.,.
graphical equal protection." They appended a Report
by respondent California Secretary of State, and the
questionnaires returned by county election officials on
which it was based. The Report concluded that there
was wide variation in the county election officials' interpretation of the challenged voting exclusions. 12 The Supreme Court of California upheld the first contention and
therefore did not reach the second one.

I
Before reaching respo11dents' co11stitutional challenge,
the Supreme Court of California considered whether the.
three county clerks' decision not to contest the action ,
together with their representation to the court that they
would henceforth permit all ex-felons whose terms of
incarceration and parole had expired to register and vote .
rendered this case moot.. That court decided that it did
not. The acquiese~f the three officials was in no way
12 The parties agree that the tick ur uniformity is Uw rr~u[L of
differing interpretations of the l!:Jfi(j Supn'illf' Courl of California
decision in Otsuka v. !lite, 64 Cal. 2d 59fi , 414 Pac. 2d 412, 51 Cnl.
Rptr. 284 (1966) , which rMined " mfamous crime" as u~ccl in tlw
California corn,titut ional provisions.
The California Srcrrtary of State',; Report noted thaI " fm]ost "·
of the 49 responding counties "have at1l'mpt0d fo develop consistent
criteria for determining which ex-frlom, shall he entitled to rrgister.
In some counties these pohcic.; have liet n formaliz0d in writing, but
in most instanres a rase-hy-case method hns been used ." The
Report concluded:
"Although the policy within most counties may be cousistent , the
fact that some counties have adopted different policies has creatrd
a situation in which there is a lack of uniformity across the state.
It appears from the survey that a person convicted of almost any
given felony would find that he is eligible to vote in some California
counties and ineligible to vote in others.
"In order to remedy this lack of uniformity, authoritative guidelines from: either the· legislature or the courts are urgently Ue<"dcd. ,..
0

.."
'·'

.

72-1589-0.PiN!ON
RICHARDSON v. RAMIREZ

9

binding on election officials of the other 55 California
counties in which respondents might choose to reside, and
it was undisputed that there were many ex-felons among
the residents of those counties who had been or would
be refused registration on the ground challenged. Because the case posed a question of broad public interesl,
which was likely to recur and which should receive a
statewide resolution, the court exercised its "inherent
discretion to resolve the issue 'even though an event
occurring during its pendency would normally render the
matter moot . ... ' This rule is particularly applicable to
challenges to the validity of election laws." In addition
to California cases, the court cited Roe v. vf' ade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973), and Goosby v Osser, 409 U. S. 512
(1973).
As a practical. matter, there ca11 be no doubt that
there is a spirited dispute between lhc• parties rn this
Court as to the constitutionality of the California provisions disenfranchising ex-felons. Even though the Supreme Court of California did not in fact issue a permanent writ of mandate. and thereforr its judgnH·11t is
in effect to a declaratory .1udgmmt, an action for sueh
relief may stem from a controversy that is "defimtc aucl
concrete, touching upon the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.' ' Aet11a Life f 11surance
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 277, 240-241 ( 10:37) By
reason of the special relationship of the public officials
in a State to the court of last resort of that State, the )
decision of the Supreme Court of California if left standing leaves them permane11tly bound by its conclusion on
a matter of federal constitutional law. Cf. North Dakota
Pharmacy Board v. Liggett. U. R. --.
This case in some respects presents stro. ngcr.argunwnts
for concluding thaL a live case in controversy remain:s
than in other election cases in which we have addressed
the question of mootness. Unlike Moore v. Ogilvie, 394

j
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U. S. 814, in which the particular candidacy was not apt
to be revived in a future election, or Hall v. Beals, 306
U. S. 45, in which the voters who had been clisenfra11chised because of a residency requirement would not have
suffered the same fate under the amended statute, respondents here are indefinitely disenfranchised by the
provisions of California law which they challenge. While
the situation in Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, was described
as "capable of repetition, yet evading review," 394 U. S.,
at 816, that involved here can b€'st be describ€'cl, in view
of the Supreme Court of California's clecis10ll against the
state officials and their obligation to follow the ltrn iH,
laid down by that court, as "incapable of repet1t10n, '
and therefore evading reviPw There are th us the strongest sort of practical arguments, as well as the language
of Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, which militate against a
conclusion of mootness in this case.
But purely practical considerations have never bee11
thought to be controlling by themselves on the issue of
mootness in this Court While the ~upreme Court of
California may choose to adjudicate a co11troversy ~mnply
because of its public importance, a11d the desirability of
a statewide decision, we are limited by thl' cas<" and
controversy requirement of Art. Ill to ad,1udicatio11 of
actual disputes between adverse parties.
The mootness problem her<" arises because, as it noted,
the Supreme Court of California was assured by the
three county clerks who were named as clefe11dants that
the three named plailltiffs would be allowed to register
and vote. The three named plaintiffs resided respectively in the California counties of San Lms Obispo,
Monterey, and Stamslaus, and the couuty clerks of
those counties who werP nam€'d as defendants 11<>1ther
defended the action i11 tho Supreme Court of California nor sought review here. Petitioner here 1s the
Qounty Clerk of Mendocino County, who though of
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course bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court of
California, since she was made a party to that action,
has no concrete dispute with voters who reside in other'
counties. Thus if the case were limited to the named
parties alone, it could be persuasively argued that there
was no present dispute on the issue of the right to
register between the three named individual respondents
in this Court and the one named petitioner here.
We think, however, that the unusual procedural his- 1
tory of the case in the S u p r < > m ~ d R
to H i ~ 1 that the litigatioll before UR is not moot
The individual named plaintiffs brought then· action ll1
the Supreme Court of California on behalf of themselves
and all other ex-felons similarly situated, and not simply
those ex-felons residing in the couuties in which the
named plaintiffs resided. While only the county clerks
of Stanislaus, Monterey, and San Luis Obispo were 11arned·
parties defendant, they were designated in the original
complaint filed in the Supreme Court of California ''a8
representatives of all other county clerks." The California Secretary of State was likewise 11amed a party
defendant. On the basis of this complaint, the Supreme
Court of California issued an alternative writ of mandate
directed to the three named county clerks "individually
and as representatives of the class of all other county
clerks and registrars of voters," directiug them to regist<>r
to vote not simply the three named plaintiffs, but "all
ex-felons whose term of incarceration and parole have
expired and who upon application demonstrate that they
are otherwise fully qualified to vote," or in the al tern a-·
tive to show cause why they ha<l uot done so upon the
return date of the writ
Petitioner Viola Richardson, the comity clerk m Mendocino County, filed a complaint iu intervention in the
action in the Supreme Court of California. all<>ging thaf
the suitcas framed by the named plaintiffs was collusive,,
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in that neither the three named county clerks nor the
Secretary of State could be expected to contest the claims
of plaintiffs. Petitioner Viola Richardson further alleged
in her complaint of intervention that she was a party to
a lawsuit brought against her by an ex-felon (also named
Richardson) who had sought to register in Mendocino
County, had been denied the right, and whose suit seeking to establish the right was then pending in the state
court of appeal.
The county clerks actually named as respondents in
the mandate action each obeyed the alternat1ve writ
issued by the Supreme Court of California, and did not
contest the named plaint1ffs' legal cla1m that they had a
right to vote secured by the l!;qual l'rotection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment wh1Ch overrode the contrary
provisions of the California Const1tut10n. The Secretary of State appeared in the action and generally demed
the named plarntitts' essential cla1ms.
The Supreme Gourt of Gallforrna, prior to the return
date of tne writ, issued an order denyrng pet1t10ner
R1ehardson 's mot10n to rntervene, but rnstead ordered
her added to the named defendants 111 the action along
with the three other named county clerks and tne Secretary of State. This action m tne ::Supreme Lourt of
Califorma, comrng as it did atter tne detau1t ot tne named
clerks m tne counties m wn1en tne named p1amt1ns res1dect, and yet at a t1me wnen tne ::Secretary or ::State
was st1l1 a party deteudant wno had answered tne complamt, c1eany mdicates to us tnat tnat court considered
the action to be not only on benalt ot tne tnree named
plamtitts, but also on benalf ot all ex-felons m l. alitorma
similarly situated. We are remtorced 111 tms conc1Us1on
by the language quoted above from tne alternate writ
of mandate 1ssued by the Supreme Court of Ca1lfornia.
Had the Supreme Court of California based its action
9n petitioner Richarqson's claim that the suit was col-
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lusive, and that it might become a binding precedent in
her litigation then pending in the state court of appeal,
it would seem to have been sufficient to grant the motion
to intervene. But the court's action adding petitioner
Richardson as a named defendant would appear to have
been based on its conclusion that at least some members
of the class represented by the plaintiffs in fact resided
in Mendocino County, and were there seeking to exercise
their right to vote. In reaching such a conclusion, of
course, the Supreme Court of California had before it
petitioner Richardson's allegation that at least her opponent in the litigation pending in the court of appeal
was not merely seeking to register to vote i11 Mendocino
County, but had brought a lawsuit to enforce his claim.
At the time petitioner Richardson was added as a
party defendant, the three named plaintiffs had obtained
the relief which they sought, whereas the remaining
members of the class, including petitiouer Richardson's
opponent in the court of appeal litigation, had not. W~
have held that in the federal system one may not repre~
se.n t a classotwli1ch he is not a part, Bailey v. Patterson ,
369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962), and if this action had
arisen in the federal courts there would be serious
doubt as to whether it could have proceeded as a
class action on behalf of the class of ex-felons denied the
right to register after the three named plaintiffs had been
granted that right. Indiana Employment Security Commission v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). But California is at liberty to prescribe its own rules for
class actions, subject only to whether limits may be
imposed by the United States Coustitution, and we interpret its action in adding petitioner Richardson as a
respondent to mean that it regarded her opponent in the
court of appeal litigation, both as an unnamed member
of the class of ex-felons referred to in the mandate complaint, a,nd as one of a cla~s actually seeking to. register
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in Mendocino County, 11,s a party to the action in the
Supreme Court of California, albeit an unnamed one.
In Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41 (1969), we
emphasized in finding the case moot that appellant's
"suit did not purport to be a class action, and he sought
no declaratory relief." Id., at 42. We said:
"In view of the limited nature of the relief sought,
we think this case is moot because the congressional
election is over. The appellant did not allege that
he intended to run for office in any future election.
He did not attempt to maintain a class action on
behalf of himself and other putative independent
candidates, present or future . He did not sue for
himself and other similarly situated as rndependent
voters, as he might have under Ohio law. . . . He
did not seek a declaratory judgment, although that
avenue too was open to him .... " Id., at 43.
Here, unlike Brockington, there was a class action , and
relief in the nature of declaratory relief was granted .
The decision below is not only binding on petitioner
Richardson, and thus dispositive of her other court of
appeal litigation, but also decides the federal constitu~ional question presented for the unnamed members of
the classes represented below by petitioner and respondents, whose continuing controversy led the Supreme Court
of California to conclude that this case was not moot.
The briefs of the parties before us indicate that the
adverse alignment in the Supreme Court of California
continues in this Court, and we therefore hold the case
is not moot.

II
Unlike most claims under the Equal Protection Clause,
for the decision of which we have only the language of
the clause itself as it is embodied in the Fourteenth
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Amendment, respondent's claim implicates not merely
the la11guage of the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the provisions of
the less familiar § 2 of the amendment:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Cougress, the executive
and judicial officers of a State, or the members of
the Legislature thereof, js d.e_niod to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or i11 any
way abridged, except Jor participation in rebellim1,
or othe'fdj,ime, the basis of the representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age
in such State." (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners contend that the italicized language of
§ 2 expressly exempts from the sanction of that section
disenfranchisement grounded 011 prior conviction of a
felony. They go on to argue that those who framed
and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have
intended to prohibit outright iu ~ 1 of that Anwndment
that which was expressly exempted from the lesser sa1wtion of reduced representation imposed by ~ 2 of the
Amendment. This argument seems to us a persuasive
one unless it can be shown that the language of ~ 2. "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime," was
intended to have a different meani11g than would appear
from it$ face ,

...
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The problem of interpreting the "intention'' of a
constitutional provision is, as countless cases of this
Court recognize, a difficult one. Not only are there
deliberations of congressional committees and floor debates in the House and Senate, but an amendment musl
thereafter be ratified by the necessary number of States.
The legislative history bearing on the meaning of the
relevant language of ~ 2 is scant indeed; the framers of
the Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect
of reduced representat!on upon the States, rather than
with the two forms of disenfranchisement which were
exempted from that consequence by the language with
which we are concerned here. Nonetheless, what legislative history there is indicate's that this language was
intended by Congress to mean what it says.
A predecessorof ~ 2 was contained in an earlier draft
of the proposed Amendment, which passed the House
of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate early
in 1866. The Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction then reconvened, and for a short period i11
April 1866, revised and redrafted what ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. The Journal of that
Committee's proceedings shows only what motions were
made and how the various members of the Committee
voted on the motions; it does not indicate the 11ature
or content of any of the discussion in the CommitteE'.
While the Journal thus enables us to trace the evolution
of the draft language in the Committee, it throws only
indirect light on the intention or purpose of those who
drafted § 2. See Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, pp. 104- 120.
We do know that thfc) particular language of § 2 upo11
which petitioners rely was first proposed by Senator
Williams of Oregon to a meeting of the Joint Committee
on April 28, 1866. Senator Williams moved tQ ~trik~

.
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out what had been § 3 of the earlier version of the draft,,
and to insert in place thereof the following:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this
Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in any
State the elective franchise shall be denied to any
portion of its male citizens, not less than 21 years
of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of reprr-·
sentation in such State shall be reduced Ill tht
proportion which the number of such male citizellf-<
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens notless than 21 years of age."

't

The Joint Committee approved this proposal by a
lopsided margin, and the draft Amendment was reported
to the House Floor with no change in the lallguag<> of
§ 2.
Throughout the floor debates in both the House a.nd
the Senate, in which numerous changes of languagP 11 1
§ 2 were proposed, the language "except for partk.u_ia
tio1i in tebellion, or other crime'' was~ver altered. Thf"
langUage of § 2 attracted a g~o<l deal of interest dunllg
the debates, but most of the discussion was devoted to
its foreseeable consequences in both the Northern and
Southern States, and to arguments as to its necessity or
wisdom. What little comment there was on the phrase
in question here supports a plain reading of it
Congressman Johll Bingham of Oh10, who was one of
the principal architects of the Fourteenth Amendmen\ ~
a11 influential member of thf' ( 'ommittee of Fifteen,
commented with respect to the second section as follows
during the Floor debates in the House

-w

" The second sect10n of the Amendment simply pro•-

11 ~ ·
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vi des for the equalization of representation among all
the States of Union, North, South, East, and West.
l t makes no discrimination. New York has a colored population of fifty thousand. By this section,
if that great State discriminates against her colored
population as to the elective franchise, ( except in
cases of crimes,) she loses to that extent her representative power in Congress. So also will it be with
every other State" Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., 2543 ( 1866)
Two other Representatives who spoke to thf' quest101 t
made similar comments. Representative Thomas Eliot.
of Massachusetts commented in support of thf' f'nact ment of ~ 2 as follows .
"Manifestly no state should have its basis of Ha ·
tional representation enlarged by reason of a port,1011
of citizens within its borders to which the rlectivf'
franchise is denied . 1f political power shall be lost
because of such denial. not imposed because of
participation in rebellio11 or other crime, it 1s to he
hoped that pout1cal mterests may work in the line
of justice, and that the end will be impartial Pnfranchisement of all citizens not disqualified hy
crime.'' Id., at 2511 (1866)
Representative Ephraun Eckley of Ohio maJe tlrn,
observation
:
~
._
"Under a congressional Act persons convicted of a
crimeagamst the laws of the United States. th e
penalty for which is imprisonment in the peniten
tiary, are now and always have beeu disenfra11chised, and a pardon did not restore them uu l<>ss
tile"warrant of pardon so provided
But suppose the mass of the people of a,
"
state are pirates. counterfeiters, or other crirn111als,

~· ·, 4
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would gentlemen be willing to repeal the laws now
ill force in order to give them all opportunity to land
their piratical crafts and com<:-' 011 shore to assist
in the election of a President or members of Congress because they arc numerous'? And let it be
borne in mind that these latter offenses are only
crimes committed against property; that of treason
is against the nation, against the whole people-tlw
highest known t10 the Jaw ." Id., at 25:35
l'he debate::, 1n the ~e11at,P drd not eove1 the 811b.1ec·t
as exhaustively as did tlw ckbatt'"' 111 tli1• H1tusP. appar·
'ently because rnauy of t,hp cnt1cal decisions wer0 made
by the Republicau :-,enators Ill an unreported sPries of
'caucuses off th(• floor
Sellator ~aulsbllt'y of lklaware .
a Democrat who was not included 1n th1, rna.1ority caucw,
;observc•d ,

" IL it-, very ,H·Il k11u\\ 11 r,hat Ll1P rna,101 tt} <it tll<·
men1bPrs of this body ,dw favor a pru])Ol'.,JtlOli of',
tins charactN ltavt' bc(•11 111 v<'ry '-'Nious rl1·lilwr,1
t1011 fu1 SPVNal dayt-- 111 rd!'n'IH't' t-<1 tltPse a1rn JHl
t1w1it::,. aod have lwld :-;orne fou1 or fiv<:> caur1i:-;<'ton th<' su b,ie<'t · / d , at 28(-l\l

l\onetlu-'less. th<' occas1011al co111rn<:>11ts of ::-;c,11u1,ur:-, 011 tht
language 111 quPstioll 1ndicaf<> a1, ut1dersta11di11g sin1ilar
t.o that of tlw Hottst> llH'llilH r~ "iP11ator He V<'nly ,Joh11so11 of Maryland . one of tlw prinmpal oppo11Pnts nf the
Fourt<:>enth Amend111e11t 1nadP tl1rn argun1< llt
~ O\\ It, tR

propos< ·cl tu d( 11y the r1gh t Lo h< n•pn·S(' ll ted of a part, ~1rnply lwcaUH<' thPy are not JH'l'·
rn1tted to Pxerc1se t.he ng:ht of voting. You do n•.>t
put tlwm upon tlw footi11g of ul if'llS, upon thf' f0t• t~
i1112, of rPheb, upon th1• footing of 111i11orF. 1ipo11 th<·
f<1oti11g of thP frrnal<'1- 11JHJll th,, fu(HJJ1).!; ul 'h"t--t
•

,.
•'

•

j
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who rnay have committed crinws of the rnost heiuo11~
character. Murderers. robbers. house burners, cou 11
t.Prfoitf'rs of the pub]i(' S<'Curities of the 1 1nited ~tate:-,
· 11 who may havt' committed any crinw. at any
tune. against thf' laws of t,hf' Pnitf'd Statf's or tht'
laws of a particular ~tate, are t,o be included withrn
rhe basis; but tlw poor black man. unless he is
permitted t.o vote is not to be represented, and is
to haw 110 intf'rest, in I.hp Government.'' f d ~.t,

m:2~t
:-,enator HendPrso11 of M 1ssoun. speak111g Ill fov1H· 1>1
version of ~ 2 which bad he<>n r<>ported hv tlw Jolllf.
C'ornmittet• 111 April as <ipposPd to tlw Parlier ]>I'll\ Is1oi>
l)f the proposl:l l v. h 1<'h had been rlPfeated rn tlw ;-;<'llat.P,
,..,a,d t,h 1s:
d1P

''The ~tat,es u11der th(• former propo::;itw11 i thl' 1:01_· ·
rPspo1Hling provisio11 of tlw original Ame1H!J11ent,
rt'JHH't<'d by the ( 'ou11uittPt' of Fifteen. which pa.,sP<t
thP House of Rt:'pn'i-w11tatives but wat- ddc•atPd 11,
tlw ~f'nat<-' l rnig;bt hav<' Pxc]uded the 11egnws undt:>r
a11 erlucat,ional test a11d y0t retain their power 111
( 'ougress flnder this thf'y caI111ot. For all pran t.1cal purposes, under the former proposition los8 oi
representation followed tlw disfranchisement of thl
11egro only; under this it follows the disenfranchisP
rnent of white all(l blaek. nnl0ss excludPd on ae
count of 'rebellion or othf'r crnrn· ·" Id. at :ma:{
J;!'L.1rt~r light 1~ 1,lt• ·d 011 tlH· 11ndt·rstandrng of thoHe
who fram<:>d and ratified the Fourteenth Atnendme11L,
and thus on the rneaning; of ~ 2 by tlw fact that at the,
tune of tlw adopt10n uf tht' Amendnwnt. 2~1 States had
prov1s10ns in their constitutions which prohibited, or au,
tbon:,r,t'd tn<' leg1slatun' to prohibit,. \'xercisP <if tht> fra11.~
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Jersons convicted of felomrs or infamous
ore 11npress1w tha11 tlw men-• existence of the t>Late
nstitutiona1 proviswns disenfranchising felons at the
e of the ado tiou of the Fourteenth Amendment ii:.
e ~ ngrl:'ssiona1 treatment of 8tates readmitted to tlw
U111011 fo llowing the Civil War,,(" F'or every State thu:-l
readmittPd, affirmative congrf'ssional action 111 the form
of au enabling acL was taken. and as a part of the
r(•admiss10n proc(•ss the Ntatf' sePkrng f('adtmsswn wa~
11,quired · to t>Ul>t111t fol' thl' approval of the < '011gn•s:-; JttproposecJ statP corn,t1tut1011. In March ot U:W7. lwfor<'
any 8tate was readnntted. Congress passed "An aet Lo
provide for tfw mun· t'tiiew11 t liuvel'llllll' n t of th!' H.elH' I
:-itates, ' the so-called H ecunstructio11 Act. . \ct of
March ~. 1Kti7, C. 15a, 14 :-,tat. 428. ~PCtJOll i) ot thf•
Rccoustruction Act established cowlit1011s on wlucli the
former ( 'onfedprate NtatE'S would be readnuttt>d to n•pr<-'·
~eutat1011 111 C'ongn•ss It pruvidt•<t

ri

!'hat v,,lu·11 tfw peoplP ol auy ulH' of ,;i1Hl
rebel :--tates shall have fortnPd a cun:-lt1tut1011 of gov'" Va. Cou~t ,\rt. ,-1, ~ l \17iH), h..,

lon~t •.\rt.~. ~ t, t li\!9);

Ohio Const. Art 4. §4 (1802), La Con~t Art H, §4 (lbl2J, Ind
Const Art. 6, § 4 (181n), Mis~ Co11st Art 6, § .5 ( 1817), Corrn.
Const. Art 6, § 2 (]811-), lll. Con::,t Art 2, § 30 (1818); Ala (oUHL
Art. 6, 5 (1819), l\lo Const t\.rt. ,1, § 14 (1820); K. ) Const.
Art. 2, § 2 (1821) Del CouHt Art . 4, § I (1831), 'fl•nt1. Con:-;t
Art. 4, § 2 (1834), Fla ConHt. Art. 6, § 4 (1888) R. I Co11~t. Art. 2,
4 (1842), N. J C'ou~t An. 2, § l ( 1R44); rex. Const Art, 7, § 4
(1845), Iowa Con,;t .\rt 2, § 5 (1846); Wise. Const Art. 8 § 2
(1848), Cahf. Conk( Art 2. § 5 ( 1849 J ; Md Const.
n 1, § 5
(1851); Mm11 Co11,.;t Art. 7 §2 (Jb57), Orr Const e\rt 2 §3
{1857) , Kim. Const Art. 5, § ::l (1859); W. Vn. Com;t. Art 3, § 1
(1863J, fo•v Com,L Art 2 § I \18G4), S C Con~t Art 4, § I
(18fi5) 0n. CouRt. Art. 2 .' Vi (1S66);
C, Const, An. fi, 85
'186g 1,
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ernrnent in conformity with the Constitution of the
United States in all respects, framed by a co11v<•ntio11
of delegates elected by the male citizeus of said State,
twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race,
color, or previous condition, who have been resident,
in said :::-itate for one year previous to the day of
such election, except such as 111,ay be disenfranchised

for partfripation 1:11 the rebellion ur for felony at cuw mo11 law, and when such constitution shall provide
that the elective franchise shall be Pn,ioyc•d by 1.tll
such p<->rsons as have the qualifications hernn :,;tated
for electors of dPl<'gatc!S, and whe11 such const1t.utw11
shall bP ratified by a rna,1onty of Lht• pr•rsous ,•otrng
on the qut>stwn of rat1ffratw11 wh o ,u·r· qualifit>d m
electors for delegate~. and ~dwu 1-,ueh t'i>llst 1tut101,
shall havP been suhniitLed to ( '011µ:1·<·s~ for ,•xu111rna ·
tion and approval. a11d Collg;tP8~ shall haVC' apprnvc•,f
the same, and wlw11 ~aid :-itate, by a vot<:' of its h!gtslaturp elected undt>r said co11:-tituL10n. shall havt-'
adopted the ame11drne11t to the ( 'on"titutiu11 ol tlw
l"nited :-itates, propos<•d hy th(" Thirty-1u11th ( '011
gress, and known as l!'t1ek fo11rt<·P t,. a11d wlH•11 said
art1e](' shall hav<· b(•('.Olllc• a part of tilt ' ( 1)11~tlt,llt1011
of tlH' l 111ted :-itatC's. :,,a1d ~tatP i'hall lw dt>('larPtf
entitkd to rPpn•::1<•ntat1011 111 ( ongn'""· 11)(1 :-;<•11aton,
and represe11tat1vcs shall lw adnuttnd tltt-•rt>trorn 011
their takillg tlw oath prescrib<'d by law, and thell
aml thereafter the pn'cediug s<·ctio11s of this aet shall
be inoperative in said :-itatt'
1 !Grnphas1s
supplieJ )
1

~ection 5 wa:-: introduet~d as a ;-,r·nutc· arnend1 11t•1Jt. to tlw
House bill, which ¼as C'OllCPl'lled only with th(· <·Htabhsh
ment of military gov<:•ru111e11t m tlw fonuer confederatP
~tates. Coi1g Globr· . :mth ( ' 011g . . 2d ~P sH . , 1:301) 1:1!\l
()867) . Tfw legislati vr history of tht> I{.econstruct101~

.,

~
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Act was recountt>d by ::-ienator H0nderson of Missouri,
who ultimately voted for it:
"As the hill originally came from the Hous<· 1t was
a bald am! naked proposition to establish without
limitation of power or the time of its duration a
purely military government for the ten ::-;tates now
unrepresented. This in my judgment ·was a most
dangerous expcrime11t.
"The H0natP, being unwilling t,o Plllbark 011 th<'
ex1wrillH'nt of purP 111ilitary rule, mod1fiPd th<> HouR<·
bill by adopti11µ, \\ hat is kno\\ 11 as tlw Blui11(• or
;-iherma11 anl<'J1dme11t
This anH·11d11w11t <·0111'P<k,l
nulitary rule, as a:,;:ked by the Hous<>. but put sollH'
sort of limit to its duration It provided that v. IH•11
the relwl staL<'S should adopt 1111ivPrsal s11ffrag<· ,
regardlt'SS of color or ra<·<'. Pxcl11di11g 11u11P, wlllk or
black, <'X<'ept for trea:-,011 or ,;;uch <'rinH·s as WPn fp)o11)
at thP co1trn1011 lav. tl11 rc•g11latio11 1>1' (•xcl11s1011 to h1·
]pft to till' :-;tatt'R tlwmsPlvPs, a11d ~liould adopt th,~
co11stitut1011al an1eudmP11t proposPd at thP la::-t s1•t--~
SHJ11 of (\111µ;r<·ss
all 1 I Ro ::-1,oll as a -;uffi<'1<·11t
uumher uf i::aid ~-Hates i::hould adopt 1t tu makP 1(, a
part of thP1r Constitution of th<' l"nitPd t-itatPs, then
military la\\ should ceasP and th<' t-itat<·s should be
ad1n1tt<>d pruvi<kd that ( 'on~;rPss sl10uld tlw11 Sl'P fit
t.o receive, tlwni
Id., at 1{)4'!

A senes of Pnabli11g acts 111 18(i8 and 1870 adtt\J UPd
thost· Mtates to representation in ( 'ongress. ThP Ac·t
admitting Arkansas, tlw first ~tate to lH' so ad rrnttPd
attached a condit10n to her admissiou ,\et of J nnP 22
1868. c. 15:i, 15 :-,tat. 72. That Act provickd
"\VHEREAS the peopk of Arkansas. 1n pursualll't'
of the prov11,,ions of au act entitlPd · A11 aet for th<·
mcn·p cfficif'nt guvPrnuwnt of the r1'bel Statt>s' passc•d
:Vla.rc:h RPC'.OJHI. <'tght<'<'ll hutHln•d a11d sixty st'vl'11 , ,11Hl
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the act supplerncutary thereto, have framed arnl
adopt<-'d a constitution of ~tate govC'rnriwnt, which
is republican, a11d th<' legislature of said Htate had
duly ratified the amendment to the Constitution of
the llnitcd States proposed by the Thirty-ninth
Congress, and known as article fourteen: Then,fore
"Be it enacted . . That the ~tate of Arkansas i~
entitled all(J admitted to representation iii Congress
as one of the States of tJw C11io11 upo1i the followin!!,
fundamental condition : That the· co1istitution ()f \r ·
kansas shall lll'V<'l' be 1,;o umc·11d<'d 1H 1111<'ha11gvd a~
to deprivP any c1t1zp11 or class of c~1t,izc•11s ()f tht·
lJnited States of the right to vote" by tlw c·o11stit 11 tH111
herein recoµ;rnzcd, except aH a puu1shnw11t for such
crimes as a,rp now felo11ws at corn1no11 la" , whc•reot
they shall have been duly couvict('d, under law:-.
equally applicable to all the rnhabitan ts of said ~tau· ·
Provided, that any alt('ratiou of said <·011st1tutio11
prospective_. 111 1t,s effPct 111ay lH· 11wdc\ 111 rqranl f.1,
tlw tirne aud placE' of rcs1de11ec• of votc•rs.·
The phrase "uudPr laws Pqually applicabl<' tu aII tlH· 111
habitants of said State' ,. was rntroduct>d as a11 a111e1Hlme11r
to the House hill by ~E'uator Drak<· of M issour1. Conµ,
Globe, 39th C'oJJg., 1st Sess., 2600 t 1868). :-;<.. nator
Drake's explanation of his r<'asou for 11itroduci11µ, his
amendme11t is illurnrnatrng . He c>xpressed ('.01ic<·rn that
without that restriction, Arkan;,:as might llliSllSf' tlw ('.\ ception for felons to dis<'t1frall(d11se :'foµ;ro<'s
"There is still a110ther oh,wct10n to the rnnrl1t1011 ati
expressed i11 tlw bill, ,wd that is Ill t11t' excc>ptio11
as to the pullishmeJJt for crn1H· The bill authorizes men to be deprived of the right, to vutP 'as a
punishment for such crirnes as are no,v felollles at
common law, whereof they shall have be<·ll duly co11~
VlCted' Tlwn' is one fu111la1ne11tal dPfP<'t i11 Lhat,

,,
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aud that is that there is no requirerneut, that t,he
Jaws under which men shaJl be duly convicted of
these crimes shall be equally applicable to all the inhabitants of the State. It is a very easy thing in a,
State to make one set of laws applicable to whit<:>
men, and another set of laws applicable to colored
rnen." Ibid .

The same "fuudameutal condition" as was imposed by
the act readmitting Arkansas was also, with only slight,
variations in language, imposed by the act readrnittinl!:
North Carolina. South Carolina, Louisia11a, U<'org1a , Ala·
bama. and Florida, e11actt'd thrP(' days lat('r. --\et ul
June 25. 1868. c. 1.53, 15 ;-;tat. 73. That co11ditiu11 was
again imposed by the acts readmitting Virginia, Mississippi. Texas, and Georgia early rn 1R70. Act of ,Ja11 2
1870, c. 10. 16 Stat. 62; Act of Feb. 1. 1870, c. 12. lo
Stat. 63; Act of Feb . 23, 1870, c. rn, H\ Stat. fi7 ; AJ't
of March 30, 1870, c. 3!:i , 16 Stat. 80
This convi11ci11g evidence of tlw h1stoncal u111lt--'rstaud •
ing of the Fourteenth Amendme11t is cunfirtned by tlw
decisions of this Court which have discussed the co11
stitutionalityof provisions d1seufranchising felons. AI
though the Court has never given plellary co1n,idt'rat1011
to the precise question of whether a State may const1t11 tio11ally excl u<le some or all convicted felons from the
franchise, we haw indicated approval of such exclusion::,
011 a number of occasiolls. In two cas0s decided toward
the eucl of t.he last ct•ntnry . tJ~e ( 'ourt a.pprov!:d l'>-Clu
sio11s of bigamists and polygauusts frorn thC' ira11clt1t:>t'
under territorial laws of l Ttah and Idaho. Jforphy \
Ramsey, 114 U. ~- 15 ( 1885); Davi.s , . Beason , t:rn l' ;-;
333 (1890). Much rnon' rt'ce ntl y wt> have ::;tro111~ly 1-,ug
gested in d-icta that exclusion of co nvicted felons from
the franchise violates ll<J constitutional prqvjsw11
tq
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Lassiter v. North Hampton County Board of Electfom; ,
360 U. S. 45 (1959), where we upheld North Carolina's
imposition of a literary requirement for voting, the Court
said, 360 U. S. 51:
"Reside11 ce requirements, age, and previous critmnal record (Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 345-347)
are obvious examples indicating factors which a
state may take into consideration in determining
the qualification of voters.''
Still more recently, we have summarily afiirnH'd two f!P
cisions of three-judge district courts rejectiug constitu~
tional challenges to state laws disC'nfranchising convicted
felons. Fincher v. Scott, 532 F Supp. 117 (MDNC'
1972), aff'd, 411 C. S. 961 ( 1973); Beachum v. Brater~
man, 300 F. Supp. 182 ( SD _Fla. l!-Hi9). aff'd. 396 P S.
12. Both District Courts relied on Gree11 ,.. Board of
Elections, 380 F . 2d 445 ( CA2 l!J67). cert. denied, 389
U, S. 1048 ( 1968). where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a challenge to New York ·s
exclusion of convicted felons from the vote did not reft
quire the convening of a three-Judge district court.
Despite this settled historical and judicial understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on state laws
disenfranchising convicted felons. respondents argue that
our recent decisions invalidating other state-imposed rc'strictions on the franchise as violative of the Equal Protection Clause require us to invalidate the clisenfran~
chisement of felons as well They rely 011 such cases as
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 ( 1972). Bullock v.
Carter, 405 0. S. 134 ( l!-)72). Kramer ,·. U11ion Free
School District, 395 TT. S. 621 (H)69), and Cipriano v
City of Houma, 395 l1. S. 701 (H)69). to support tht>
conclusious of the Hupreme Court of California that a
State must show a "compelling state> intnest'' to justify

·,.
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~xclusion of ex-felons from the franchise and that Cali~
fornia has not done so here.
As we have seen, however, the exclusion of felons from
the noted has an affirrn_ative sariction in ~2of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in
the case of the other restrictions on the franchise which
were invalidated in the cases on which respondents rely.
We hold that the understanding of those who adopted
~he Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express
language of ~ 2 and in the historical and judicial inter~
pretation of the Amendment's applicability to state laws
disenfranchising felons, is of co11troll.ing significance m
distinguishing such laws from those other state limiLa-·
tions on the franchise which have been held invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause hy this Court WP
do not think that the Court's refusal to accept Justict•
Harlan's position in his dissents in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533. 589 (1964), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 l1. S.
89, 97 ( 1965), that § 2 is the only part of the Amend~
ment dealing with voting rights. dictates an opposite :
result. We need not go 1lf'arly so far as Justice Harlall
would have to reach our conclusio11, for we may rest 011
the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1, in dealing'.
with voting rights as it does, could not have been rnea1ii \
to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was
expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of
reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms
of disenfranchisement. Nor cau we accept respondents'
argument that because § 2 was made part of the Amendment "largely through the accident of political exigen~y
rather than for the relation which it bore to the other
sections of the Ameudment,'' we must not look to Jt '
for guidance in interpretmg 1. It is as mnch a part of
the Amendment as anv of the other sections and ho,, ·
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it became a part of the Amendment is less important;
than what it says and what it means.
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and hy am'ic1
curiae, are contentions that these notions are outrnorled
and that the more modern view is that it is essential to
the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he bP
returned to his role in society as a fully participating
citizen when he has completed the serving of his term.
We would by no means discount these arguments if
addressed to the legislative forum which may properly
weigh and balance thPrn against those advanced i11 support of California 's present constitutional provisimis.
But its not for us to choose one set of values ovrr tlw
other. If respondellts are correct, and the view which
they advocate is indeed the more enlightened and scnsiblf'
one, presumably the people of the State of California will
ultii:nately com€' around to that view. And if they do
not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least,. of the
fact that there are two sides to the argument
We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Cali
fornia erred in cone] uding that California may no ]01Jgcr
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of tlw Four
teenth Amendment, exclude from the franchise convicted
felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.
The California court did not reach respondents' altrrnative contentio11 that there was such a total lack of umformity in county election officials' euforcement of the
challenged state laws as to work a separate denial of
equal protectiou, and Wt.' believe that it should haw
an opportunity to consider the claim before we address
ourselves to it. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinio11,
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today holds a State may strip ex-felons who
have fully paid their debt to society of their fundamental right to vote without running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This result is, in my view, based on an unsound historical analysis which already has been rejected
by this Court. In straining to reach that result, I believe
that the Court has also disregarded important limitations
on its jurisdiction For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent.
l[

A bnef retracing of the procedural history of this case
1s necessary to a full understanding of my views. Each
of the respondents, the plaintiffs below/ had been cone
victed of a felony unrelated to voting and had fully
served his term of incarceration and parole. Each applied
to register to vote in his respective county-Ramirez in
San Luis Obispo County, Lee in Monterey County, and
Gill in Stanislaus County. All three were refused registration because, under applicable provisions of the CaliThe proceedmgs below was a petition for a writ of mandamus
in the California, Supreme Court, hence the moving parties should
properly be describPd as petitioners rather than plaintiffs. However, to av01d confusion, since the petitioners below are the respondents here and vice-versa, the parties in the California Court
will be referred to herein simply as plaintiffs and defendants,
1
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fornia Constitution, "no person convicted of any i11famous
crime shall exercise the privilege of an elector."

2

The three named plaintiffs filed a petition for mandam us 111 the California Supreme Court, invoking its
original jurisdiction. Plaintiffs challenged the State's
disenfranchisement of ex-felons as being violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Pourteenth Amendment
and sought issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to
compel their registration. The complaint labelled the
suit as brought "individually and on behalf of all other
persons who are ineligible to register to vote in California
solely by reason of a conviction of a felony other than an
election code felony" and who had fully served their terms
of incarceration and parole. The complaint named, as
defendants, the election officials who had refused to
register them, "individually and as representatives of the
class of all other County Clerks and Registrars who have
the duty of determining for their respective counties
whether any ex-felon will be denied the right to vote."
The three named election officials did not contest the
action and represented to the state court that they would
permit the named plaintiffs and all similarly situated exfelons in their counties to register and to vote. The
representative of the Secretary of State of California, also
named as a defendant, has similarly agreed not to contest
the suit.a At this point in the litigat10n all of the named
~

Cnhforma Con~t1tut10n, Art. II, § 1 provided, in part, that
person convicted of any mfamous crime . . . shall ever exercise
the privileges of an elector in this State." Article II,§ 1 was repealed
by referendum at the November 7, 1972, general election and was
replaced by a new Art. II , § 3 containing the same prohibition.
The State implementing statutes include California Election Code
§§ 310, 321, 383, 389, 390, and 1420.
a The Attorney General has filed a separate petit10n for certiorari,
No. n-:-324, to review the judgment of the California Supreme Court .
The Secretar> of State filed a memorandum opposing that petition
for Pert1oran.
1'no
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plaintiffs had been voluntarily afforded the relief thei
were seeking by the election officials in their respectiv€\
counties;
Subsequently, the petitioner in this Court, Viola
Richardson, as County Clerk of Mendocine County, filed
a motion to intervene in the proceedings before the Cali=
fornia Supreme Court She indicated to the c6urt that
she was being sued in a separate acti<fo in a ldwer state
court by an ex.. felon seeking to register in her county
and that the decision in this case would be dispositive of
the legal issue in that controversy. The State Supreme
Court ordered Richardson added as a na,n1ed defendant in
1
the instant action, but did not name the ex-felon suing
lrnr as a plaintiff or ntUrtecl class representative herein.
In its opinion, the California Supreme Court found
the case not be moot and took the opportunity to address the merits of the Fourteenth Anientlinent issue. It
indicated that, in its view, the ex-Jelon disenfranchise"'
ment provision of the California Constitution and its implementing statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause,
The state court did not, however, afford the plaintiffs the
relief they sought. The court denied the peremptory
write of mandamus.
Although the California Supreme Court did not issue a
Writ ordering Richardson to register EJith~r the ex.. felon
,:ming her or any other potential elector in her county,
she sought review of the State courtis decision by way of
writ of certiorari in this Court. The electibn officials in
the named plaintiffs' counties did not seek review and the
Secretary of State filed a memorandum opposing review
by this Court.
A
There are a number of reasons why I do not believe
this case is properly before us 1:1,t this time. First, I am
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persuaded that the judgment of the California Supreme
Court rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
"This Court from the time of its founding has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of State Courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds . . . . Our only power over
State judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And, our
power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the State Court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion." Herb v,
Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945).
Plaintiffs sought, from the California Supreme Court,
a writ of mandamus compelling their registration. The
state court denied that relief. The entirety of the judgment of that court is as follows:
"The alternative writ having served its purpose, is
discharged, and the petition for peremptory writ is
denied." 4

''

rrhe accompanying opinion indicates that the California
court did not consider the case before it to be moot and
that, on its view, the plaintiffs' assertion that the disen~
franchisement provisions were unconstitutional was well
taken. Since the court nonetheless denied plaintiffs the
relief they sought, we can only conclude that it did so on
independent state law grounds. Cf. Brockington v,
4
The judgment of the California Supreme Court is by custom
the final paragraph of its opinion. The Alternative Writ referred
to is merely a show cause order, requiring the respondent to com.
ply with the petitioner's demand or show ca.1.we why it should not
be ordered, to do so,

,

...

...

. '
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lt,',•.1-

7!2-1589"-biSSENT
RiCHARDSON v. RAMIREZ

5

Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, 44 (1969) . For example, man..
clamus being a discretionary writ, the State court may
have declined its issuance simply because the named
plaintiffs, had already been registered and mandamus
reiief seemed unnecessary. There is certainly no indication that the decision to deny the writ was baled on the
State court's view on any federal question.
This Court creates an interesting anomaly by purporting to reverse the judgment of the California, court. Since
that court denied a writ of mandamus to compel the
registration of ex-felons, the only disposition consistent
with this Court's view that the California disenfranchise•
ment provisions are constitutional would be to affirm the
judgment below. By reversing, the court apparently directs the issuance of the peremptory writ. This anomaly
demonstrates that this is a classic example of a case where
"the same judgment would be rendered by the State court
after we corrected its views of federal laws," Herb v. Pitcarin, supra, hence we can but offer an advisory opinion
here. Whether we agree or disagree with the State
court's view of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions, the judgment of the State court will necessarily
remain to deny the writ of mandamus.
The majority is aware of this problem and purports to·
resolve it by speculating that the California court may
have afforded plaintiffs declaratory relief. Such speculation is totally unfounded. Neither the opinion nor the
judgment of the court below even mentions declaratory
relief. The plaintiffs did not seek a declaratory judg_ment. The California Constitution on its face appears to
.bar the State Supreme Court from issuing a declaratory
.judgment in an original proceeding such as the one before
.us, since it limits that court's original' jurisdiction to
"proceedings for extraordinary relief, in the nature of
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition." Calif. Constit.
A.rt, 6., ~ 10. Exclusive jurisdiction for suits seeking

•.
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declaratory relief 1s vested, by statute, in the state super10r courts.r.
The majority's only basis for construrng the judg1,1ent
of the court below as affording declaratory relief is its argu•
ment that because the California Supreme Court is the
highest court of the State, its observations on the constitutionality of the challenged disenfranchisement provisions are apt to be heeded by state officials. It is true
that the opinion of the California court did indicate a
v10w on the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claim.
But this Court's power "is to correct wrong judgments
not to revise opinions." Herb v. Pitcarin, supra. One
could always argue that where a state court had commented Oil a matter of federal law, state officials would
heed those comments. To say that such comments are a
"drclaratioll of federal law " reviewable by this Court is a
rat10nale that would reach every case m which the state
court decision rests on adequate state grounds, rendermg that doctrine a virtual nullity. That many state
officials may heed a state court's advice does not render
its advisory opinion Oil federal law reviewable by this
Court, if its Judgment is supported by an adequate and
independent state ground. There is little doubt but that
many public officials would also heed an advisory opinion
issued by this Court, but that does not free us from the
constitutional limitations 011 our Juri~d1ction.
Because I believe that the judgment of the California
,c ourt was based on adequate and independent state
grounds, I do not think we have jurisdiction to consider
any other issues presented by this case.

B
Assuming, arguendo, that the California Supreme Court
rhd grant a drclaratory judgment, I still believe that
'Calif. Code Civ Pror § JOGO, see 15 Cal. Jur. 2d, Declaratory
R<'hef § rn.
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we are without .iurisdict10n because no case or contro~
versy 1s presented. The Court seems willing to concede
that the claims of the named plaintiffs may well be
moot. Ante, at 11. The Court, however, premises its
Jurisdiction on the assumption that there is a live controversy between the named petitioner in this Court and the
unnamed plaintiff class members in her own county. To
reach this conclusion, it is essential for the Court to conclude that this case is, in fact, a class action and that, in
the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to look to
unnamed class members to determine whether there is a
live controversy
I am forced to point out that one of the crucial premises
upon which the Court bases its assumption of jurisdiction-the existence of a class action-is a product of mere
speculation. I am persuaded that the California court
never treated this case as a class action. As the ma.1ority
notes, the case was titled a class action by its originators.
But the California court was, of course, not bound by
that designation. In the entirety of its lengthy opinion,
the California court does not once refer to this suit as a
class action , to respondents as class representatives, to the
existence of unnamed parties or to any other indicia of
class act1011 status. Rather, the state court describes the
case as simply "a proceeding for writ of mandate brought
by three ex-felons to compel respondent election officials
to register them as voters.'' The opinion proceeds to list
the three plaintiffs and, in a footnote, to explain that the
only other plaintiffs were the League of ·w omen Voters
and three nonprofit organizations which support the interests of ex-felons. The opinion describes the defendants as the election officials of San Luis Obispo, Monterey,
and Stamslaus Counties and the Secretary of State
' •• " 111 his capacity as chief elections official of California, '' and notes that " [ u l pon ·applfoation ·w·e ordered
'.the Mendocino County Clerk rtne petitioner here ·I joined
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as an additional party defen(lant." This description of the
parties plainly indicates that this suit was not treated as
a class action by the state court. I think it highly inappropriate that on the basis of nothing but speculation,
this case be fashioned into a class action, for the first time,
in this Court.

C
Even assuming both that this case is a class action and
that declaratory relief was granted, two highly unlikely
suppositions. I still would not agree that this case is
properly before us. I do not believe that we can look to
beyond the named class members to find a case or controversy in the circumstances of this case. The Court seems
to hold that review is not foreclosed by the possible mootness of the named plaintiffs' claim because unnamed class
members are still subject to the challenged disenfranchisement, hence the case presents, as to unnamed class mem..
hers, an issue capable of repetition yet evading review.
I disagree,
As the Court properly notes, a general rule of justiciability is that one may not represent a class of which he
1s not a part. Thus, as a general proposition, a federal
court will not look to unnamed class members to establish the case or controversy requirement of Art. Ill. 6
But, the "evading review" doctrine of Southern Pacific
R. Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), as recently applied in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,333 n. 3 (1972),
provides a limited exception to the general rule-an exception necessary to insure that judicial review is not
0

The Court has held, for example, that Art. III restricts standrng
to bring a cla::;s action to tllC' artual members of the class. O'Shea v.
Littleton, U. S. (1974). The named plaintiffs had been
d1:-;enfrancl11:-;rd at the tune they filed suit, and there is thus no
question that they had standing to challenge the California disen..
.franclnRement provisions.

"
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foreclosed in cases where intervening events threaten to
invariably moot the named plaintiff's claim for relief.
The necessity for looking beyond the named class members in this limited category of cases is evidenced by our
decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), in
which the Court struck down a durational residence re~
quirement for voting. The suit had been brought to
compel the registration of the named plaintiff and the
members of the class he represented in order that they
might participate in an election scheduled for August 6,
1970. The Federal District Court did not order preliminary relief in time for the August election and, by
the time the District Court decided the case, the next
election was scheduled for November of 1970. By then,
the named plaintiff would have met the challenged threemonth requirement.. The District Court, nonetheless, reJected the State's argument that the controversy over the
validity of the three-month requirement was therefore
moot.
By the time the appeal reached this Court, the only
named plaintiff had also satisfied the one-year state residence requirement. We nonetheless reached the merits,
observing that "although appellee [ the only named plaintiff] can now vote, the problem to voters posed by the
Tennessee residence requirement is capable of repetition,
yet evading review. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814,816
(1969)." 405 U. S., at 333, n. 2. Both this Court and
the District Court found that, although the named plaintiff had satisfied the challenged residence requirements
and would no longer be disenfranchised thereby, the case
was not moot. But the challenged requirement remained
applicable to unnamed class members,7 and the issue
7 The Court di,,tmgui,,hed its deci,,ion m Hall v. Bea1s, 396 U. S .
45 (1969), finding a challenge to Colorado's durational residence
requirrment moot, on the grounds that, in Hall, there had been an
jntervening change in law reducing the residence requirements from
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presented was likely to evade review. Obviously the
mere passage of a few months would invariably have
rendered a challenge to the residency requirements by
individual named plaintiffs moot-threatening to virtually foreclose Judicial review.
A similar situation was presented in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), relied on by the California court. We
there held that although a woman who was not pregnant
at the time the suit was filed did not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Texas abortion
laws, a continuing controversy over the constitutionality
.of those laws existed as to a named plaintiff who was
pregnant when the suit was filed, even though she may
not have been pregnant at later stages of the appeal.
We concluded that this case provided a classic example
of an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review,
hence the termination of the plaintiff's pregnancy while
the case was on appeal did not render the case mooteven though a woman whose pregnancy has ended 1s no
more affected by the abortion laws than one who was not
pregnant at the time the suit was filed. "[T]he human
gestat10n period is so short that pregnancy will come to
term before the usual appellate process comes to a conclusion. If that termination makes a case moot, . . .
.appellate review will be effectively denied." Id., at 125.
There are two common threads running through these
cases-rn each the challenged statute would continue to
be applied but the named plaintiff's claim would inevitably mature into mootness pending resolution of the
lawsuit. In Roe, the termination of pregnancy, in Dunn,
the pMsage of the residency requirement period, and in
~ix month,; to two while the case was on appeal. Accordmgly, application of the six-month requirement was mcapable of repetition as
to the named plaintiff or any otllC'r member of his class, and, havmg
never been disenfranchised thereby, the named plaintiff had no
.,;tandmg to challenge the two-month rcqmrement,
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other votrng cases, the occurrence of an election,8 deprived
the named plaintiff of a continuing controversy over the
a,ppiication 6f the challenged statute. In each instance,
the mere passage of time threatened to insulate a constit,utional deprivation from judicial review, and it is tha~
danger which served as the raison d'etre for rejecting sug~
gestions of rriootness. Where an invalid statute would
th us continue to be applied simply because judicial r~view of a live controversy involving the named plaintiff
was invariably foreclosed-the issue would be capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Accordingly, the Southern Pacific doctrine requires the
satisfaction of two tests in order to provide an answer
to a suggestion of mootness. First, the claimed deprivat10n must, in fact, be "capable of repetition." This ele ..
ment is satisfied where, even though the named plaintiff 1s
pnmediate controversy has been mooted by intervening
,events, either be or Unnamed class members may cort~
tinue to suffer the alleged constitutional deprivation in
.the future. The case before us clearly satisfies this first
~ The Court has found a hvC' controversy in other voting cases in
wl11rh 111tern•n111g c1rcumstanrl'8 seemC'd to have mooted the nam!'d
plamtiff's claim for relief. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969),
for C'Xamplf•, waH an appeal from a deris10n denying relief to appellants who hat! unsucces:,fully ;;ought to be certified, as required by
~tat(> law, as mdependc>nt randidatC's for Presidential elector on
thP 11:l(i~ ballot. Appellant,; assf'rted that the Illinois cert1ficat10n reqmrC'ment v10lated the State's const1t utioual obligation not to dis<'nminate agamst voters in lesH populous counties. By the time
t hC'tr appeal rC'ached th1~ Court, tlw 1968 C'lect10n had already taken
placC', b1t1 we held the ca1:;e was not moot because "while the 1968
clect10u 1s owr,
the challenged burden remams and controls
future dC'C'tJOns," 1d., at 8Hi, ~ee Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 49
( 1969), and the short span of time between the denial of certification for randidacy and artual ballot mg thrratq1 to moot all ,~t,1ture
(ti tacks 011 the queRt10ned candidacy reqmrements, 394 U. S., at 816.
SC'c• abo, i:itore.r v. Brown, - U. S. - , - , n. 8 (1974); Rosario

,·. lfockefe/{er, 410 TT. S 752, 7.56, n 5 (1973).

·
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element of the &Juthern Pacific doctrine test in that
presumably the challenged disenfranchisement provisions
could continue to be applied to unnamed class members
in counties other than those in which the named plain ..
tiffs reside.9
Second, the issue presented must be likely to evade
review, but for invocation of the Southern Pacific doctrine. lt is 611 the "evading review!' element that the
Court's analysis fails. Because the claim raised in this
case concerns not a time-related but rather a statusbased deprivation, there is no issue evading review and
no reason to look beyond the named plaintiffs. 10 This is
The extent of continuing disenfranchisement is apt to be minitnal. A survey conducted by the Secretary of State of California
indicated that the election officials of 52 of the 58 counties in Califorma, representmg counties which contain 97.39% of the registered
voters rn the State, agreed with the registrars in the named plain~
tiffs' counties that, ex-felons should not be barred from voting in
their counties. Brief for respondent, at 30.
10 The majority cites our decision in Indiana Employment Secu~
nty Division v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973), for the proposition
that unnamed class members may not be looked to in cases arising
from the federal system, but the case does not supµort that proposition. Burney concerned a constitutional challenge to the terminatJon of unemployment rnsurance benefits without a prior hearing.
The only named class representative received a post-termination
hearmg at wluch she obtamed a reversal of the initial determination
of mehgiblity and full retroactive benefits. The Court remanded for
consideration of mootness. The jurisdictional issue in this Court
revolved around whether the case presented issues "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." The Court did not have to find
the alleged ronst1tutional deprivation incapable of repetition, hence
was not concerned with the problem of whether a future application
to the namc•d class representative was required. Rather, it appeared that the prior hearing issue was not one which would evade
review. But see id., at 542-545 (dissenting opinion). The Court
reasoned that a post-termmat1011 hearing, afforded as a matter of
course, would not invariably moot all claims for relief from members of the class. 1f the post-termination hearing did not result
0
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hot a situation

where, by the time the case reaches this
Court, it wili lllways be too late to grant the named
plaintiff relief. If and when an ex-felon is refused access
to the voting rolls because of his past criminal record, an
intervening election will not moot his claim for relief and
the status giving rise to his disenfranchisement will not
inevitably terminate pending review.
There are clearly ways in which a challenge to the
California disenfranchisement provisions could reach this
Court. The Supreme Court of California has not issued
a writ of mandamus compelling the registration of any
ex.felon. If such a potential voter is, in fact, refused
registration, a controversy suitable for resolution by this
Court will be presented. The suit brought against petitioner Richardson, by an ex-felon resident of her own
county, raising the same issues as those presented by this
case, is presently pending in a California intermediate
appellate court. 11 In that case, petitioner Richardson did,
in fact, deny this plaintiff registration because he was an
ex.felon. Once that case completes its passage through
the state courts, it could well serve as a vehicle for our
review of the California disenfranchisement provisions.
That is, of course, but one example of how the issue
presented here could properly reach this Court. This
in an award of retronctive pnyments, as it had in the named plaintiff's case, a live and continuing controversy would be presented as
to the insurcd's claim to the benefits allegedly wrongfully withheld
pending the hl:'armg. A case had already come to this Court in
just sueh a posture, and the Court had summarily affirmed the
judgment of the three-judge court. 'Porres v. New York State Department of Labor, 405 U. S. 949 (1972), but see id., at 971 (dissenting opinion) . It was a failure to satisfy the "evading review"
element of the test that led the Court to remand Burney for considerat10n of mootness
11 The suit agamst Richardson, Richardson v. James & Richardson,
l Civ. 32283, is presently pending in Division 3 of the Court of Ap~
peals for the First Appellate District of California,
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case does not therefore benefit from the Southern Pacific
doctrine's authority to look to unnamed class members to
establish a case or controversy.
That the California Supreme Court appears to have
found the plaintiffs' claims not to be moot does not detract
from this conclusion since "even in cases arising from the
.State courts, the question of mootness is a federal one,
which a federal court must resolve before it assumes juris.diction.'' North Carolina v. Rice, 401 U. S. 244, 246
(1971). Thus, unlike the majority, I am persuaded that
we can look only to the named plaintiffs to satisfy the
case or controversy requirement of Art. III.

D
The named plaintiffs here were registered only because
the registrars in their counties had voluntarily abandoned
an allegedly illegal practice of disenfranchising ex-felons,
and we have said that "mere voluntary cessation of il~
legal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts
would be compelled to leave 'the defendant free to return
to his old ways.
[But] a case might become moot
if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the
alleged wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur." United States v. Concentrated Export
Assn., 393 U. S. 499 (1968); accord United States v.
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,632 (1953). Accordingly,
whether the named plaintiffs have a live controversy with
the registrars in their own counties would depend on the
likelihood of future disenfranchisement. 12 But we need
not consider that question here because none of the election officials in the named plaintiffs' counties sought re~
view in this Court and none is now before us.
12
If chums of the named plamtJffs arc moot, the proper di8position
of this case would seem to be to vacate the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ca liforma and remand for such proceedings as that court
deems appropriate . Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41 , 44 (1969) ,

i' .

~.
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The sole petitioner before this Court is Viola Richardson. None of the named plaintiffs are residents of her
county. While those named plaintiffs may or may not
have a live controversy with the registrars in their owri
c8unties, they surely do not have one with petitioner
Richardson; Whlie Richardson may well have a live
controversy with ex~felons in her own county over the
· validity of the disenfranchisement laws, those ex-felons
are not before this Court, and she has no dispute with the
named plaintiffs. In sum, there is no controversy between the parties before this Court. Petitioner Richardson seeks to· use the named plaintiffs controversy with
their dwn c6unty registrars as a vehicle for this Court to
issue an advisory opinion on the issue presented by the
suit brought against her by an ex-felon in her own county.
Such a decision would violate the "oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability .. ,
that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.H
Flast v. Cohen, 397 U. S. 82, 96 (1968) .

II
. Since the majority nevertheless reaches the merits of
the constitutionality of California's disenfranchisement of
ex-felons, I find it necessary to register my dissent on the
merits as well. The majority construes § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an express authorization for the
States to disenfranchise former felons. Section 2 does
except disenfranchisement for "participation in rebellion,
or other crime'' from the operation of its penalty provision. As the majority notes, however, there is little
independent legislative history to the crucial words "or
other -crime"; the proposed § 2 went to a joint committee containing only the phrase "participation in rebellion"
and emerged with "or other crime" inexplicably tacked

•'
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on."13 In its exhaustive review of the lengthy legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
come upon only one explanatory reference for the "other
crimes" provision-a reference which is unilluminating
at best. 14
The historical purpose for § 2 itself is, however, relatively clear and, in my view, dispositive of this case. The
Republicans who controlled the 39th Congress were concerned that the additional congressional representation of
the Southern States which would result from the abolition
of slavery might weaken their own political dominance. 15
There were two alternatives available-either to limit
southern representation, which was unacceptable on a
long-term basis,1~ or to insure that southern Negroes,
sympathetic to the Republican cause, would be enfranchised, but an explicit grants of suffrage to Negroes was
thought politically unpalatable at the time.11 Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the resultant compromise. It put Southern States to a choice-enfranchise
Negro voters or lose congressional representation. 18
See, e. g., Note, Restoring the Ex-offrnder's Right to Vote:
Background and Developments, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 721, 746-747,
n. 158 (1973)
11
Statement of Rrpre;,entative Eckley, quoted, ante, at 18.
1 ~ Bonfield, Thr Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcrment of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Corn. L. Q. 108, 109
(1960); Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 98,
126 (1908) ; Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen
on Reconstruction 290--291; James, The Framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1956) ; Van AIHtyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, "The
Right to Vote," and the Understandmg of the 39th Congress, 1965
Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 44.
16 James, n. 28, supra, at 138-139.
17
Kendrick , n. 28, supra, at 291 , cf. Flack, n. 28, supra, at 111,
!18
18
Bonfield, n. 28, supra, at 111 ; James, n. 28, supra, at 185, Van
Alstyne, n. 28, SiUpra, at 43-44, 58, 65.
13

,, .
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The political motivation behind ~ 2 was a limited one.
It had little to do with the purposes of rest of the Fourteenth Amendment. As one noted commentator explained :
"It becarne part of the Fourteenth Amendment
largely through the accident of political exigency
rather than through the relation which it bore to
the other Sections of the Amendment .... 19 It seems
quite impossible to conclude that there was a clear
~nd deliberate understanding in the House that § 2
expressly recognized the States' power to deny or
abridge the right to vote." 20
It is clear that § 2 was not intended and should not be
construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 2 provides a special
remedy-reduced representation-to cure a particular
form of electoral abuse-the disenfranchisement of
Negroes. There is no indication that the framers of the
provisions intended that special penalty to be the exclusive remedy for all forms of electoral discrimination.
This Court has repeatedly rejected that rationale. See,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Carrington v..
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) .
Rather, a discrimination to which the penalty provision of ~ 2 is inapplicable must still be judged against the
Equal Protection Clause of § 1 to determine whether
judicial or congressional remedies should be invoked.
That conclusion is compelled by this Court's holding in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 ( 1970). Although § 2
excepts from its terms denial of the franchise not only to
ex.. felons but also to persons under 21 years of age, we
held that the Congress, under § 5, had the p@wer to imple1.0

Van Alystyne, n. 38, supra, at 43-44.

~oId ., ut 65,
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ment the Equal Protection Clause by lowering the voting
age to 18 in federal elections, As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN,
joined by Ma. JuSTICE WHITE, as well as myself, there
observed, § 2 was intended as no more "than a remedy
supplementary, and in some conceivable circumstances
indispensable to other Congressional and judicial remedies available under Sections I and V." Id., at 152.
The Court's references to congressional enactments
contemporaneous to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, such as the Reconstruction Act and the readmission statutes, are inapposite. They do not explain
the purpose for the adoption of § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. They merely indicate that disenfranchisement for participation in crime was not uncommon in the
States at the time of the adoption of the Amendment.
Hence, not surprisingly, that form of disenfranchisement
was expected from the application of the special penalty
provision of § 2. But because Congress chose to exempt
one form of electoral discrimination from the reduction of
representation remedy provided by § 2 does not necessarily imply congressional approval of this disenfranchise"
ment. 21 By providing a special remedy for disenfran"
chisement of a particular class of voters in § 2, Congress
21 To say that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a direct limitation on the protection afforded voting rights by § 1 leads to absurd
results. If one accepts the premise that § 2 authorizes disenfranchisement for any crime, the challenged California provision could,
as the California Supreme Court has observed, require clisenfranchisement for seduction under promise of marriage, or conspiracy to
operate a motor vehicle without a muffler. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 CaJ.
2d 596, 414 P. 2d 412 , 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). Disenfranchisement extends to conv1ct10ns for vagrancy in Alabama or breaking
a water pipe m North Dakota, to note but two examples. Note Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 Stan. L. Rev.
845, 846-847 ( 1973) Even a Jaywalking or traffic conviction could
conceivably lead to disenfranchisement, since § 2 does not differentiate between felomes and misdemeanors.

.
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did not approve all election discriminations to which the
§ 2 remedy was inapplicable, and such discriminations
thus are not forever immunized from evolving standards
of equal protection scrutiny. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 638-639 ( 1969). There is no basis for concluding that Congress intended by § 2 to freeze the meaning of other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
'conception of voting rights prevalent at the time of the
adoption of the Amendment. In fact, one form of dis'e nfranchisement-one year durational residency requirements-specifically authorized by the Reconstruction Act,
one of the contemporaneous enactments upon which the
majority relies to show the intendment of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, has already been declared
unconstitutional by this Court in Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 u. s. 330 (1972) .
Disenfranchisement for participation in crime, like
durational residency requirements, were common at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But
" [c] onstitutional concepts of equal protection are not
immutably frozen like insects trapped in some Devonian
amber." Dillenburg v. Kramer, 460 F. 2d 1222, 1226
(1972). We have repeatedly observed that:
"The Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the
political history of a particular era. In determining
what laws are constitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality any more than we have restricted due process to
a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed
to be the limits of fundamental rights.'' Harper v.
Board of Elections, 283 U. S. 663, 669 (1966) .

Accordingly, neither the fact that several States had exfelou disenfranchisement laws at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor that such ,disenfranchisement was specifically excepted from the special

;

"
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remedy of § 2, can serve to insulate such disenfranchise.:.
ment from equal protection scrutiny.

III
tn my view, the disenfranchisement of ex-felons must

ba Measured against the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amend·
ment. That analysis properly begins with the observation that because the right to vote "is the essence of a
democratic society and any restr~ction on that right strikes
a.t the very heart of representative governme11t," Reynu
olds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 535 ( 1964), voting is a
"fundamental" right. As we observed in Dunn v. Blum8tein, 405 U. S. 330, 337 ( 1972):
"There is no reason t.o repeat now the labors undertaken in earlier cases to analyze [the] right to vote
and to explain in detail the judicial role in reviewing
state statutes that selectively distribute the franchise. In decision, after decision, this Court has
made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Evans v_. Corman, 398 U. S. 419, 421-422, 426
(1970); Kramer v. UniJn Free School District, 395
U. S. 621, 626-628 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U. S. 701, 706 (1969); Harper v.
Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 667 ( 1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 93-94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, supra,"
We concluded, "if a challenged statute grants the right to
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others,
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling State interest." Ibid.
(Emphasis original.)
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To determine tha,t the compelling state interest test
Applies to the challenged classification is, however, to settle only a threshold question. "Compelling state interest" is merely a shorthand description of the difficult proc~
ess of balancing individual and state interests that the
Court must emb:3:rk upon when faced with a classificatio11
touching on fundamental rights. Our other equal pro.,
tection cases give content to the nature of that balance.
The State has the heavy burden of showing first, that the
challenged disenfranchisement is necessary to a legitimate
and substantial state interest; second, that the classification is drawn with precision-that it does not exclude
too many people who should not and need not be excluded; and third, that there are no other reasonable ways
to achieve the State's goal with a lesser burden on the
constitutionally protected interest. E. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343, 360 (1972); Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 632 (1969); See
Rosari'J v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 770 (1973) (POWELL,
J., dissenting); cf. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, V. S. (1974); NAACP v. Button, 371
U. S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479,
488 (1960) .
I think it clear that the State has not met its burden
of justifying the blanket disenfranchisement of former
·felons presented by this case. There is certainly no basis
for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in the
democratic process than any other citizen. Like everyone
else, their daily lives are deeply affected and changed by
the decisions of government. See Kramer, supra, at 627.
As the Secretary of State of California observed in his
memorandum to the Court in support of respondents in
this case :
"It is doubtful ... whether the state can demonstrate
f:)ither a compelling or rational policy interest m

,I
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denying former felons the right to vote, The individuals involved in the present case are persons
who have fully paid their debt to society. They are
as much affected by the actions of government as
any other citizens, and have as much right to
participate in governmental decision-making. Furthermore, the denial of the right to vote to such
persons is a hindrance to the efforts of society to
rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law
abiding and productive citizens." 22

It is argued that disenfranchisement is necessary to
prevent vote frauds. Although the State has a legitimate and, in fact, compelling interest in preventing elec,.
toral fraud, the challenged provision is not sustainable
on that ground. First, the disenfranchisement provisions are patently both over- and under-inclusive. ·The
provision is not limited to those who have demonstrated
a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating
election laws. Rather, it encompasses all former felons
and there has been no showing that ex-felons generally
are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder
of the population. See Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F. 2d
1222, 1225 (CA9 1973). In contrast, many of those
convicted of violating election laws are treated as misdemeanants and are not barred from voting at all. It
seems clear that the classification here is not tailored to
achieve its articulated goal, since it crudely excludes
large numbers of otherwise qualified voters. See Kramer,
supra, at 632; Cipriano v. City of H'Juma, 395 U.S. 701,
706 (1969).
Moreover, there are means available for the State to
prevent voting fraud which are far less burdensome on
the constitutionally protected right to vote. As we said
22
Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in opposition to certiorari, Ramirez v. Richardson, No, 73-324.
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in Dunn, supra, at 353, the "State has at its disposal a
variety of criminal laws that are more than adequate to
detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared." Cf.
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 543 (1965):
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). The Cali..
fornia court's catalogue ()f that State's penal sanctions
for election frauds surely demonstrates there are ade ..
quate alternatives to disenfranchisement.
"Today . . . the Elections Code punishes at least
76 different acts as felonies, in 33 separate sections;
at least 60 additional acts are punished as misdemeanors, in 40 separate sections; and 14 more acts
· are declared to be felony misdemeanors. Among
this plethora of offenses we take particular note, in
the present connection of the felony sanctions against
fraudulent registrations ( § 220), buying and selling
of votes ( §§ 12000-12008), intimidating voters by
threat or bribery (§§ 29130-29135), voting twice, or·
fraudulently voting without being entitled to do so,
or impersonating another voter (§§ 14403, 2943029431), fraud or forgery in casting absentee ballots
( §§ 14690-14692), tampering with voting machines
( §§ 15280), or ballot boxes ( §§ 17090-17092), forging or altering election returns ( §§ 29100-29103), and
so interfering with the offices holding an election or
conducting a canvass, or with the voters lawfully
exercising their rights of voting at an election, as to
prevent the election or canvass from being fairly held
and lawfully conducted. (§ 17093) (Footnotes
omitted.'' Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 215216 (1973) .
Given the panoply of criminal offenses available to deter
and to punish electoral misconduct, as well as the statu.tory reforms and technolo~ical changes which have trans.',!
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formed the electoral process in the last century, such election fraud may no longer be a serious danger. 28
Another asserted purpose is to keep former felons from
voting because their likely voting pattern might be subversive of the interest's of an orderly society. See Green
v. Board of Elections, 380 F. 2d 445, 451 (CA2 1967) .
Support for the argument that electors can be kept from
the ballot box for fear they might vote to repeal or emasculate provisions of the criminal code, is drawn primarily
from this Court's decisions in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U. S. 15 (1885) , and Dav-is v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333
( 1890). In Murphy , the Court upheld the disenfranchisement of anyone who had ever entered into a bigamous or polygamous marriage and in Davis, the Court
sanctioned, as a condition to the exercise of franchise, the
requirement of an oath that the elector did not "teach,
advise counsel or encourage any person to commit the
crime of bigamy or polygamy." The Court's intent was
clear-"to withdraw all political influence from those who
are practically hostile to" the goals of certain criminal
laws. Murphy, supra, at 45; Davis, supra, at 348.
To the extent Murphy and Davis approve the doctrine
that citizens can be barred from the ballot box because
,t hey would vote to change the existing criminal law, those
decisions are surely of minimal continuing precedential
value. We have since explicitly held that such "clifferences of opinion may not be a basis for excluding any
group or person from the franchise," Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U. S. 701, 705-706 ( 1969); see Communist
Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, U. S. (1973);
Evans v. Corman, 380 U. S. 419, 423 ( 1970).
" [I] f they are residents, they as all other qualified
residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for
political representation . . . . 'Fencing out' from the
~s

Richardson v. Ramirez, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 214 (1973) .
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franchise a sector of the population because of the
way they may vote, is constitutionally 11npermis
sible." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 94 (1965);
see Dunn, supra, 405 U. S., at 355,
4

Although, in the last century, this Court may have·
justified the exclusion of voters from the electoral process
for fear tha,t they would vote to change laws considered
important by a temporal majority, I have little doubt
that we would not countenance such a purpose today.The process of democracy is one of change. Our laws
are not frozen into immutable form, they are constantly'
in the process of revision in response to the needs of a
changing society. The public interest as conceived by a
majority of the voting public is constantly undergoing reexamination. This Court's holding in Davis, supra, and
Murphy, supra, that a State may disenfranchise a class
of voters to ''withdraw all political influence from those
practically hostile" to the existing order, strikes at tha
very heart of the democratic process. A temporal major..
ity could use such a power to preserve inviolate its view
of the social order simply by disenfranchising those with
different views. Voters who opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised those who advocated
repeal "to prevent persons from being enabled by their
votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country." Davis,
supra, 133 U. S., at 348. Today, presumably those who
support the legalization of marihuana could be barred
from the ballot box for much the same reason. The
ballot is the democratic system's coin of the realm. To
condition its exercise on support of the established order
is to debase that currency beyond recognition. Rather
than resurrect Davis and Murphy, I would expressly
disavow any continued adherence to the dangerous notions therein expressed.24
24

The majority also notes that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons
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The public purposes asserted to be served by disenfranchisement have been found wanting in many quarters.
When this suit was filed, 22 States allowed ex-felons fuil
access to the ballot. Since that time, four more States
have joined their ranks. 25 Shortly after lower federal
has received sltpport in the dicta of 1his Court and that we have
only recently affirmed without opinion the decisions of two three..
judge district courts upholding disenfranchisement provisions.
Pincher v. Scott, 352 F . Supp. 117 (MDNC 1972), aff'd mem., 411
U.S. 961 (1973); B eacham v. Braterman, 300 F. S. 182 (SD Fla.) ,
aff'd mem., 396 U. S. 12 (1969). But, dicta is not precedent and as
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST has only recently reminded us, summary
affirmances are obviously not of the same precedential value as would
be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.
Edelman v. Jordan, - U.S.-, (1974). See Frankfurter and
Landis, The Businf'ss of the Supreme Court at October Term1929, 44 Harv. L . Rev. 1 (1930) .
25 The following States did not permanently disenfranchise former
felons: Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-707 (Supp. 1971); Colorado,
Colo. Const., Art. VII; § 10, and Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-3-2 (1)
(Perm. Cum. Sup. 1971); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 940.05 (1973);
Hawaii, Hawaii Const., Art. II, § 2 and Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 716-2
(Supp. 1971) ; Illinois, Ill. Const., Art . 3, § 2 and Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 46,
§ 3-5, 29A-5 (Smith-Hurd Sup. 1972); Indiana, Ind. Stat . Ann.
§ 19-4804 ; Kansas, Kan. Stat . Ann. 22-3722; Maine, Me. Const.,
Art. II, § 1; Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 51, § 1, IA; Michi~
, gan, Mich. Laws Ann. § 168.10; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 609.165 (1)
(1964) ; Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 216.355 (3); New Jersey, N. J .
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19.4-1 (Supp . 1972-1973) ; Nebraska, Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 83-1, 118 (4) (1971); New Hampshire, N. H . Rev. Stat.
§ 607-A (Supp. 1972) ; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. , § 2967.16 (Supp.
1972) ; Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stats. §§ 137.240, 137.250 (1969 Replacement) ; Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, § 623-2 (k), 951-2,
2602 and Tit. 19, § 893; South Dakota, S. D. Code §§ 24-5-2 and
23-57-7 (1967) -; Vermont, Vt. Const., c. I, Art. 8 and c. II, § 32;
West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 3-1-3 and 51 Op. W. Va. Alt. 4 Gen.
182 (1965) ; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57-078 (Supp. 1972-1973);
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-311 (1957).
In 1972 Montana amended its constitution to disenfranchise poten.tial electors only while "serving /\ septence far a f~lony ." Mont.
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courts sustained New York's and Florida's disenfranchisement pr&visidns, the iegislatures repealed those laws,
Cdngress has i'ecently provided for the restoration of
ffjlons' voting rights at the end of sentence or parole irt
t,he District cl Ctjlutnbia. 21 b. C. Code § 1-1102 (7);
1'he National Conference on Umform State Laws/ 0 the
American Law institute, 21 the National Probation and
Paroie Association, 28 the Nati6nal Advisory Coinmission
dn Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,2° the Presi;.
Const ., Art. 1V, § 2. In 1973, New York amended its laws to allow
former felons whose sentence had expired or who were released from
parole to vote. 17 N'ew York Election Laws, § 152 (McKinney
Supp. 1972'-1973) . Also in 1973, North Carolina amended its laws
. to restore all civil rights including the franchise to former (elons
discharged from prison or parole. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1. And, in
, the same year, the Tennessee legislature amended its ex-felon disenfranchisement statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-205.
The New York ex-felon disenfranchisement provision was upheld
in Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 380 F . 2d
445 (CA2 1967), and shortly thereafter the New York legislature
repealed that law. N. Y. Election Law § 152 (McKinney Supp.
1972-1973). Similarly the Florida disenfranchisement provisions
were upheld in Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 1048 (SD Fla.
1968), aff'd mem., 396 U. S. 12 (1969). Subsequently, Florida
statutes were amended to provide for the automatic restoration of
all civil rights, including the franchise upon the completion of
sentence or release from parole or probation. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 940.05 ( 1973).
26
National Conference on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Act on
the Stat us of Convicted Persons, § 2-3 ( 1965).
27
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code ~ 306.3.
28
National Probation and Parole Association, Standard Probation
and Parole Act , §§ 12 and 27 ( 1955) .
29
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, Report on Corrections, Standard 16.17 (1973). The
Report observed that :
"Loss of citizenship--[including] the right to vote ... -inhibits
reformatjve etiorts. If corrections is to re.integrate an offender into
society, the off~nd~r · m~t ' retain all attributes of citizenship. tP,
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dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 3-0 the California League of Women
Voters, 31 the National Democratic Party, 32 and the Secretary of State of California 33 ha,ve all strongly endorsed
full suffrage rights for former felons.
The disenfranchisement of ex-felons had "its origins
in the fogs and fictions of federal jurisprudence and
doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal
significance or the extent of its infringement upon the
spirit of our system of government." Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Ikla. 728, 731, 139 P. 948, 949 (1914).
I think it clear that measured against the standards of
this Court's modern equal protection jurisprudence, the
blanket disenfranchisement of ex-felons cannot stand.
I respectfully dissent.

addition his respect for law and the legal system may well depend,
in some measure, on his ability to participate in that system.
Mandatory denials serve no legitimate public interest." Id., at 593.
30 Presjdent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections, 90 (1967):
tration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections, 90 ( 1967) :
victed felons of the vote . . . . [T] o be deprived of the right to
representation in a democratic society is an important symbol . ...
Moreover, rehabilitation might be furthered by encouraging convfoted persons to participate in society by exercising the vote."
81
California League of Women's Voters, Policy Statement, February 16, 1972.
32
National Democratic Party, Party Platform 1972.
33
Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Oppo.
sition to certiorari in Richardson v. Ramire;, No. 73-324,

.,

·,

~

· ~;.

•.

.iu.prtmt <1f 1t1ttt itf tqt 'Jt!ttiti>b .:§tttttg
,rtt$qiltgt014 ll}. ~ - 2llp'1,
'i

CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

June 14, 1974

RE: No. 72-1589 Richardson v. Ramirez
Dear Thurgood:
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Please join me in your dissenting
opinion in the above.
Sincerely,

,·

MR. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Thurgood:
In 72-1589, Richardson v. Ramirez please add at the end of
your opinion.
Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with Part I A of this opinion,
dissents from a reversal of the judgment below as he cannot say
that it does not rest on an independent state ground.
Hayakawa v. Brown

See

--US-- (Douglas, J. writing as Circuit Justice).

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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